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TRADEMARK LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW—DECEPTION IS A CRUEL ACT1: “UNIFORM” STATE DECEP
TIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACTS AND THEIR DECEPTIVE EFFECTS ON
THE TRADEMARK CLAIMS OF CORPORATE COMPETITORS
INTRODUCTION
The Lanham Trademark Act,2 enacted in 1946, was created to
protect and regulate commerce through the registration of trade
marks for goods and services.3 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), sec
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act addresses the deceptive use of
protected trademarks via means of false advertising and other un
fair trade practices.4 Courts have generally held that in order to
have standing to bring suit under section 43(a), plaintiffs must be
competitors in the marketplace.5 Since the stated purpose of the
Lanham Act is the protection of commercial interests, common
consumers are not typically afforded standing to bring claims under
section 43(a), because they have none.6
Complaints of false advertising and unfair trade practices made
under the Lanham Act often give rise to state-law claims of decep
tive trade practices born of the same infringement.7 Modeled after
both the Federal Trade Commission Act8 (“FTCA”) and the Uni
1. “Deception is a cruel act. . . . It often has many players on different stages that
corrode the soul.” Donna A. Favors, Member of the Bd. of Directors of the Montgom
ery Institute (1955), available at http://thinkexist.com/quotation/deception_is_a_cruel_
act-it_often_has_many/250933.html.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141n (2006).
3. Travis Ketterman, Lanham Act Does Not Cover Consumer Claims, 7 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REP. 31, 38 (1994).
4. James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-Competi
tive Measure?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1091-92 (1995).
5. Brian Morris, Consumer Standing to Sue for False and Misleading Advertising
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 418
(1987).
6. See, e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993); Colli
gan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. See Marcia B. Paul, Basic Principles of Section 43(a) and Unfair Competition,
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 81, 98 (1995), available at 419 PLI/PAT 81 (Westlaw).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2006).
549
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form Deceptive Trade Practices Act9 (“UDTPA”), deceptive trade
practices acts (“DTPA”) seek to prevent consumer fraud and de
ception. These statutes make actionable the “pass[ing] off [of]
goods or services as those of another or caus[ing] confusion regard
ing the source of sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or
services”10 and are often replete with desirable promises of en
hanced attorneys’ fees and treble damages awards. When the
DTPAs were first adopted by the states, many of these statutes dic
tated that only the State Attorney General could bring suit on be
half of private individuals.11 But with the passing of time, private
rights of action were recognized under the DTPAs.12 This recogni
tion, however, gave rise to a new debate among the states—should
the private right of action be extended to corporate competitors or
restricted solely to individual consumers?
While some states have afforded standing to corporate compet
itors under the DTPAs, albeit with restrictions,13 other states have
precluded corporate competitors from making claims under the
DTPAs.14 Further still, some states have limited the private right of

9. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000),
7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/
1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
10. John L. Reed, Lanham Act and Deceptive Trade Practice Claims Arising
Under State Professional Licensure Laws, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 223, 259 (1997).
11. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 486 (1967).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-110b (West 2007) (requiring proof of
ascertainable loss); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 2, 11 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 358-A:2 (2009) (requiring analysis of nature of transaction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19
(West 2001) (requiring proof of ascertainable loss); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKin
ney 2004) (requiring actual harm to the public); Trent Partners & Assocs., Inc. v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 84, 106 (D. Mass. 1999) (requiring proof of “rascality”);
see also ABA COMM. ON BUS. & CORPORATE LITIG., ANNUAL REVIEW OF DEVELOP
MENTS IN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LITIGATION § 6.3, at 204 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1212 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 201-3, -9.2 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-2, -5, -5.2 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 2453, 2461(b) (2006); Scully Signal Co. v. Joyal, 881 F. Supp. 727, 741 (D.R.I.
1995) (“The Rhode Island Act only provides private rights of action to the Attorney
General and to ‘person[s] who purchase or lease goods or services primarily for per
sonal, family, or household purposes. . . .’” (citation omitted)); Permagrain Prods., Inc.
v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[The Pennsylvania]
act limits private suits to goods purchased by consumers for their personal use”); see
also ABA COMM. ON BUS. & CORPORATE LITIG., supra note 13, § 6.3, at 204.

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE306.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 3

DECEPTION IS A CRUEL ACT

18-JUN-10

12:58

551

action under the DTPAs solely to corporate competitors.15 The dis
crepancy present in the interpretation of the DTPAs has left many
corporate plaintiffs, who often do business in more than one state,
without any legal remedy for trademark infringement under these
state DTPAs. Not only are corporate competitors unable to fully
litigate their claims in a court of law, but they are also denied the
possibility of receiving the treble damages and attorneys’ fees,
which the vast majority of the DTPAs offer as relief.16
This discrepancy in the law is particularly problematic when
corporate plaintiffs attach deceptive-trade-practices allegations to
section 43(a) Lanham Act claims, primarily because, under the
Lanham Act, only corporate competitors have standing to bring
suit.17 Corporate competitors’ rights are especially frustrated in the
northeastern United States due to the geographic proximity of its
small, clustered states. Because these states are so close together,
corporate competitors are wont to engage in business in many of
them. This is problematic because a trademark-related claim aris
ing out of a defendant’s deceptive trade practice that is actionable
in one state is not similarly actionable in another.
This Note will explore the legal history and ramifications of the
DTPAs of representative states of the First, Second, and Third Cir
cuits upon section 43(a) Lanham Act claims between corporate
competitors. This analysis suggests that the states of the First, Sec
ond, and Third Circuits must reform their DTPAs through the
adoption of a uniform act to allow for cohesion in the Northeast of
available remedies to corporate competitors.
Part I of this Note will detail the history and purpose of the
Lanham Act (the “Act”), including the scope of the Act itself and
how it applies to and affects corporations. Part II will examine the
evolution of the state DTPAs from the early days of the FTCA, to

15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532 (2005); Wald v. Wilmington Trust Co.,
552 A.2d 853, 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (“The statute is meant to provide a remedy for
injuries to business interests, rather than for harm to individual consumers.”).
16. Dole, supra note 11, at 495. Although injunctive relief is the primary function
of the UDTPA, reasonable attorneys’ fees and treble damages are awarded at the dis
cretion of the court. Id. The states’ failure to correct the discrepancy between the
existing DTPAs serves as a deterrent to corporate competitors seeking to fully recover
upon their claims. Under the section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, attorneys’ fees are
awarded only in “exceptional cases.” Reed, supra note 10, at 258.
17. See Morris, supra note 5, at 417.
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the development of the UDTPA,18 and finally to the formation of
the “Little FTC Acts.”19 Part III will then discuss the DTPAs and
their application to corporate competitors.
Part IV of this Note will provide the recommendation that, to
redress the discrepancies present in the DTPAs, it is necessary to
devise new requirements for corporate competitors to be afforded
standing under these acts. In contrast to Rhode Island20 and Penn
sylvania’s21 strict rule of law prohibiting corporate competitor
claims and Delaware’s act22 allowing only corporate competitors to
bring claims, the states of the Northeast ought to blend the treat
ments of the law by states within the First, Second, and Third Cir
cuits to adopt a true uniform law. To achieve this goal, clear
guidelines as to standing requirements for corporate competitors
under the DTPAs must be formed.23 Further, the states must estab
lish revised terms for what a competitor-plaintiff must prove in or
der to succeed on his claim.24 Lastly, the states must craft a final,
concise definition of what constitutes a “deceptive trade practice.”25
If such a uniform system were implemented, corporations in the
Northeast would be able to operate with greater efficiency and
without fear of being unable to litigate their valid claims in a court
of law.
I. THE LANHAM TRADEMARK ACT
The evolution of the Lanham Trademark Act has shaped the
protection of trademarks in our country. To a large extent, judi
cially rendered standing requirements have determined who can,
18. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000),
7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/
1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
19. Each of the fifty states has crafted its own version of the Federal Trade Com
mission Act in the form of statutes dubbed “Little FTC Acts,” which are used as mech
anisms to deter deceptive trade practices. Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive
Trade Practices Under “Little FTC Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK.
L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1990).
20. R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§ 6-13.1-2, -5 (2001); Scully Signal Co. v. Joyal, 881 F. Supp.
727, 741 (D.R.I. 1995).
21. Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-3 (West 2008); Permagrain Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Mat
& Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532 (2005); Wald v. Wilmington Trust Co., 552 A.2d
853, 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988).
23. See infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 232-275 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 276-288 and accompanying text.
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and who cannot, bring suit under the Lanham Act.26 Importantly,
the courts have decided that only corporate competitors may be af
forded this right.27 Ordinarily this is not a problem. However,
these standing requirements may become hazardous to a competi
tor-plaintiff’s suit if a DTPA claim arises, despite the fact that these
claims are born of the same infringement that sparked Lanham in
tervention in the first place.
A. Lanham’s Purpose: Trademark Infringement, Trademark
Dilution, and False Advertising Claims
In lay terms, a trademark is a sign or logo that is affixed to a
product or service to signal ownership of the goods as well as a legal
right to exclusive use by the owner of the mark.28 Black’s Law Dic
tionary defines a trademark as a “commercial substitute for one’s
signature.”29 The essential commercial purpose of a trademark is to
guarantee, sell, and advertise the product or service to which it is
attached.30 The critical element of every trademark is that it must
“identify and distinguish” one company’s products from an
other’s.31 In order to receive federal protection, trademarks must
have the following five attributes: (1) affixation;32 (2) use;33 (3) dis

26. See Kevin M. Lemley, Resolving the Circuit Split on Standing in False Adver
tising Claims and Incorporation of Prudential Standing in State Deceptive Trade Prac
tices Law: The Quest for Optimal Levels of Accurate Information in the Marketplace, 29
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 283, 296 (2007) (“[P]rudential standing requirements
remain[ ] constant in that a competitive injury and some degree of competition [is] re
quired to have standing for a section 43(a) false advertising claim.”); see also infra note
50 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
28. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1325 (11th ed. 2005).
29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (9th ed. 2009).
30. 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 17:1, at 17-9 (4th ed. 2009).
31. SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 1:1:1, at
1-2 (4th ed. 2006).
32. Trademarks must be “affixed” to a product such that the product or service is
immediately recognizable by the consumer in the marketplace. INTELLECTUAL PROP
ERTY FOR THE INTERNET § 1.12, at 1-12 (Lewis C. Lee & J. Scott Davidson eds., 1997).
33. Companies must use or have an intent to use the trademark within interstate
commerce in order for federal protection to be granted. Id.

R
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tinctiveness;34 (4) lack of similarity to other marks;35 and (5)
nonfunctionality.36
The Lanham Act, created in 1946 to replace the Trade-Mark
Act of 1920,37 was passed specifically to address infringement,38 dilution,39 and false advertising claims.40 The Lanham Act’s purpose
is clear, providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he intent of this [Act] is
34. “A distinctive mark is one that is unique or nonordinary.” Id. There are five
categories of distinctiveness in the trademark arena—those that are fanciful, arbitrary,
suggestive, descriptive, and generic. Id. § 1.12, at 13. While some trademarks are in
herently distinctive (fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive) and may be registered immedi
ately, others are not (descriptive and generic) and must acquire secondary meaning in
the marketplace before becoming registrable. Id.
35. Federal “[t]rademark protection will not be given to a mark that is likely to
cause confusion with another registered mark.” Id. In examining this standard, trade
mark examiners will consider the similarity of the marks with respect to
appearance, sound, connotation, . . . impression[,] . . . [the] nature of the prod
ucts or services[,] . . . [the] established trade channels for the products or ser
vices[,] . . . [the] conditions of the sale (impulse purchase versus sophisticated
purchase)[,] . . . [the] fame of the prior mark[,] . . . [the] number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar products or services[,] . . . [the] nature and
extent of any actual confusion[,] . . . [and the] variety of products and services
with which the mark is used.
Id. § 1.12, at 13-14.
36. The nonfunctionality requirement states that trademark protection is not usu
ally available for functional or utilitarian purposes or features of a product. Id. § 1.12,
at 14.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141n (2006); see Theresa E. McEvilly, Virtual Advertising in
Sports Venues and the Federal Lanham Act § 43(a): Revolutionary Technology Creates
Controversial Advertising Medium, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 603, 616-17 (1998).
38. Trademark infringement is “[t]he unauthorized use of a trademark—or of a
confusingly similar name, word, symbol, or any combination of these—in connection
with the same or related goods or services and in a manner that is likely to cause confu
sion, deception, or mistake about the source of the goods or services.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 852 (9th ed. 2009).
39. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, trademark dilution is “[t]he impair
ment of a famous trademark’s strength, effectiveness, or distinctiveness through the use
of the mark on an unrelated product, usu[ally] blurring the trademark’s distinctive char
acter or tarnishing it with an unsavory association.” Id. at 524. To recover for trade
mark dilution, a plaintiff must prove ownership of a famous mark and actual dilution of
that mark. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003).
40. A statement of advertisement “that tends to [deceive or] mislead consumers
about the characteristics, quality, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or com
mercial activity” is considered false advertising under the Lanham Act. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 677 (9th ed. 2009). False advertising need not be false but only misleading
in a material way. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a). To succeed in a false advertising case, a plaintiff
must prove generally the following elements:
1. . . . [A] false or misleading description or representation of fact in commer
cial advertising or promotion [has been made]; 2. That description or represen
tation actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment
of the intended audience; 3. Such deception is material to consumers in that it
is likely to influence the purchasing decision; 4. The false advertiser caused its
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to . . . mak[e] actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
. . . ; to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition; [and] to prevent fraud and deception . . . by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of regis
tered marks.”41 In order to effectuate this broad purpose, Congress
included a section in the Act that focused upon consumer protec
tion from misuses of trademarks.
B. Section 43(a) and Its Effect on Consumers and Corporations
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, in effect, created a federal
remedial statute dealing with consumer protection issues, while at
the same time encompassing unfair competition claims.42 As origi
nally enacted, section 43(a) of the 1946 Lanham Act dealt solely
with claims relating to false designation of origin.43 This narrow
language created confusion within the court system as to the Lan
ham Act’s stance on false advertising, primarily because the Act’s
legislative history was unclear as to whether section 43(a) ought to
carry a broader arsenal “against general misrepresentations in
advertising.”44
Congress resolved these issues in 1988 with the passing of the
Trademark Law Revision Act.45 The Trademark Law Revision Act
expanded the scope of section 43(a) to include both infringement
and false advertising claims.46 To be successful in a section 43(a)
claim, a plaintiff must prove that a business entity’s commercial ad
vertising venture utilizes materially false statements that deceive, or
falsely advertised goods or services to enter into interstate commerce; and 5.
The plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of such falsities.
Michael F. Clayton, Handling Unfair Competition and False Advertising Cases, in PRAC
TISING LAW INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 261, 269 (2001), available at 677 PLI/PAT 261 (Westlaw); see Lem
ley, supra note 26, at 285. Because of its focus on deceptive trade practices between
corporate competitors, this Note will deal primarily with the false advertising and in
fringement aspects of section 43(a) the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
41. Lanham Act of 1946 § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
42. See Paul, supra note 7, at 86.
43. The 1946 version of the Lanham Act adopted much of its language from the
federal statute it replaced—the 1920 Trade-Mark Act. The 1920 Trade-Mark Act was
designed such that standing to bring suit was limited to “any person, firm, or corpora
tion doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or in the region in
which said locality is situated.” Trade-Mark Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 2, 41 Stat.
533, 533-34 (repealed 1946); see also McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-17.
44. McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-17.
45. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935; see
McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-18.
46. See McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-18.
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have the capacity to deceive, a substantial portion of a populace
through interstate commerce due to the statements’ injurious na
ture.47 Despite the clarification of the Lanham Act’s reach, the
question of whether the Act extended its remedies to consumers
still remained unanswered.48
On its face, the language of the Lanham Act appears to grant
consumers the right to bring suit. In relevant part, section 43(a)
states that
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of original, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval or his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
47. Bruce P. Keller, “It Keeps Going and Going and Going”: The Expansion of
False Advertising Litigation Under the Lanham Act, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE:
COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 135, 148-49 (1997),
available at 775 PLI/COMM 135 (Westlaw); see, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (concluding that the “false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin . . . of [one’s] goods” is
actionable under the Lanham Act (omissions in original) (quoting section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1996) (asserting that
misrepresentations made about a plaintiff’s goods are actionable under the Lanham Act
if four-pronged test is satisfied); Nat’l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224,
1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a plaintiff must establish that the requirements of the
four-pronged test have been met in order to bring suit).
48. See Richard A. De Sevo, Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a)—An Issue
Whose Time Has Passed, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 8 (1998). Confusion in the courts
over consumers’ ability to bring suit under the Lanham Act has ensued since the Act’s
inception in 1946. Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising
Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 836 (1999). The “vast majority” of courts
choose to deny consumer standing, concluding that the purpose of the Act is “to protect
primarily competitors rather than consumers.” Id. These questions of ability to bring
suit boil down to the federal courts’ adherence to prudential standing limitations,
“which are ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’” Greg
ory Apgar, Prudential Standing Limitations on Lanham Act False Advertising Claims,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2389, 2394 (2008) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162
(1997)).
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shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an act.49

Because section 43(a) uses such broad language—allowing
“any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” to
bring suit—one might conclude that it was Congress’s intent to ab
rogate prudential standing requirements.50 In terms of the Lanham
Act, prudential (or, rather, judicially imposed) standing serves to
limit the class of plaintiffs to those whom the Act was meant to
protect.51 Some commentators have asserted that the Lanham Act
was designed with the “dual goals” of protection for both consum
ers and competitors.52 Section 45 of the Lanham Act, however,
states that the Lanham Act’s purpose “is exclusively to protect the
interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous com
mercial conduct.”53 Thus, Lanham Act standing requires that a
plaintiff be a corporate competitor.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
50. See Apgar, supra note 48, at 2400. Standing, a right which arises from the
Constitution, refers to one’s ability to bring a matter before a court of law. Peter S.
Massaro, III, Filtering Through a Mess: A Proposal to Reduce the Confusion Surround
ing the Requirements for Standing in False Advertising Claims Brought Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2008). Prudential
standing is said to be a “creature[ ] of prudence.” Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from
Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Fed
eral Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1198 (2008). Prudential stand
ing requirements are not derived from the Constitution but, rather, are congressionally
or judicially imposed. Id. Unless a statute states otherwise, prudential standing re
quirements are automatically assumed by the courts presiding over federal litigation.
Diane Taing, Comment, Competition for Standing: Defining the Commercial Plaintiff
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493, 497 (2009). The
ories of prudential standing typically refer to three distinct categories:
the rule against allowing a party to assert a generalized grievance; the rule
against ordinarily allowing a party to assert the rights of others; and the rule
that a party be arguably within the zone of interest of the statutory or constitu
tional provision the party raises in support of its position.
Stern, supra, at 1199. In section 43(a) claims, the courts have generally subscribed to
the rule concerning the parties’ “zone of interest.” Gerald P. Meyer, Standing Out: A
Commonsense Approach to Standing for False Advertising Suits Under Lanham Act Sec
tion 43(a), 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 318 (2009). This form of prudential standing is
meant to “limit the class eligible to bring suit under Section 43(a) to those who Con
gress intended to protect.” Massaro, supra, at 1679-80. As this Note asserts, Congress
meant only to protect corporate competitors under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
51. Massaro, supra note 50, at 1679-80.
52. See Tawnya Wojciechowski, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Ar
gument for Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing for False Advertising
Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 SW. U. L. REV. 213, 223 (1994).
53. George Russell Thill, The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act: Damage
Awards for False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43 (a)—Congress
Drops the Ball Twice, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 361, 377 (1994) (quoting Colligan v. Activi
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In 1954, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set the standard
for prudential standing in section 43(a) cases in L’Aiglon Apparel v.
Lana Lobell, Inc., which held that corporate competitors had stand
ing to bring suit in deceptive-advertising cases.54 It was not until
1971, however, that the courts addressed the question of consumer
standing.55 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Colli
gan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd. that consumers lacked
standing to bring actions under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.56
Nearly forty years later, in 1993, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
rendered the same holding in Serbin v. Ziebart International
Corp. 57 The vast majority of courts have fallen in line with the Col
ligan and Serbin decisions and denied a private right of action to
consumers.58 Further, both the Second and Third Circuit Courts
have expressed that a private right of action for consumers under
section 43(a) was not necessary due to other viable avenues, such as
ties Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The intent of this chapter is . . . to protect persons
engaged in [ ] commerce against unfair competition.”).
54. L’Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). The
L’Aiglon court went on to state that “[section 43(a)] is a provision of a federal statute
which, with clarity and precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and de
fines rights and duties [for corporate competitors] and provides for their vindication in
the federal courts.” Id. at 651.
55. De Sevo, supra note 48, at 8.
56. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693.
57. Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993).
58. Berni v. Int’l Gourmet Rests. of Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1988)
(“Although a section 43 plaintiff need not be a direct competitor, it is apparent that, at
a minimum, standing to bring a section 43 claim requires the potential for a commercial
or competitive injury.” (citations omitted)); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The Lanham Act . . . constitute[s] a private
remedial scheme for the benefit of disgruntled competitors whereas the FTC Act more
specifically serves the public interest and is enforced by the FTC.”); Albert Furst von
Thurn und Taxis v. Karl Prince von Thurn und Taxis, No. 04 Civ. 6107 (DAB), 2006 WL
2289847, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006) (“Standing to assert a § 43(a) claim is limited to
a ‘purely commercial class’ of plaintiffs.” (quoting Colligan, 442 F.2d at 692)); Joint
Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 692, 708 (D. Del. 1999) (“[I]n order to
maintain standing under Section 43, a litigant must, at a minimum, establish the ‘poten
tial for a commercial or competitive injury.’” (quoting Berni, 838 F.2d at 648)); Katz
man v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[O]nly
commercial entities with a reasonable interest to be protected may sue under [section
43(a)].”); Loy v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 991, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(“[I]f Congress had contemplated the major change urged . . . and bestowed standing
under Section 43(a) on pure consumers, it would have done so explicitly.”); Shonac
Corp. v. AMKO Int’l, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 919, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“[T]he purpose of
§ 43(a) is revealed to be ‘to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)).
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state consumer protection laws or Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) intervention.59
The courts have time and again followed the L’Aiglon Apparel
decision and stated that only corporate competitors may bring suit
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.60 In support of these deci
sions, scholars have acknowledged that, had Congress intended to
provide consumers any relief under section 43(a), there would have
been some semblance of this intent in the statute’s text or legisla
tive history.61 The Colligan and Serbin courts speculated that what
Congress did intend to create was a remedy that protected commer
cial interests from unfair commercial conduct.62 These inferences
were drawn from consideration of whether the plaintiff had a “rea
sonable interest to be protected against false advertising.”63
Accordingly, corporate competitors have been granted both
economic and equitable remedies under section 43(a) of the Lan
ham Act.64 The Lanham Act provides for both injunctive relief as
well as damages.65 As far as injunctions are concerned, section
43(a) claims do not require a plaintiff to show the full extent of
actual damages; rather, plaintiffs need only demonstrate a “likeli
hood of deception” and “the fact of damage.”66 Perhaps the most
attractive feature of the Lanham Act’s remedies is the sheer broad
ness of its damages provisions, which empower courts to award
59. Thill, supra note 53, at 376-77.
60. Robert S. Saunders, Note, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic Justification
for Competitors’ Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
77 VA. L. REV. 563, 572 (1991); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693-94; De Sevo, supra note 48, at 26.
62. Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175; Colligan, 442 F.2d at 694; Ketterman, supra note 3, at
38.
63. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1981).
64. Reed, supra note 10, at 259. It has been a long-standing rule among the
courts that any consumer rights that may be embodied within section 43(a) “must be
invoked by a competitor of the defendant, not by a buyer from the defendant.” 5 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 27:25 (4th ed. 1996). In sum, it seems as if courts will continue to adhere to the belief
that corporate competitors are “the ultimate beneficiar[ies]” of the Act, and consumers
in turn will be protected by “competitor-instigated suits.” Burns, supra note 48, at 837.
65. Successful plaintiffs in section 43(a) Lanham suits may receive damages rep
resenting compensation for disgorgement of profits, dilution of the mark, harm to repu
tation and goodwill, cost of corrective advertising, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
Bundy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 748 F.2d 767, 771-74 (2d Cir. 1984). The typical dam
age award under section 43(a), however, may be limited to “the infringer’s profits, any
damages to the trademark owner, the costs of the action, and, in exceptional cases,
reasonable attorneys’ fees.” ADAM L. BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK LAW: PROTECTION,
ENFORCEMENT AND LICENSING § 9.05[B], at 9-102 (1999).
66. 1A ALTMAN & CALLMANN, supra note 30, § 5.5, at 5-38-39.
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treble damages in cases of particularly egregious conduct.67 Since
1982, there have been approximately two hundred section 43(a)
cases tried in federal courts where monetary damages were
awarded.68 Not surprisingly, eighty-six percent of the damages in
those cases have been awarded since the rapid emergence of the
Internet Age in the early 1990s.69 Fifty percent of all trademark
damages since 1982 included an award of enhanced damages, and
seventy-seven percent of those damages were trebled.70
Because the courts perceived the Lanham Act as offering pro
tection solely to corporate plaintiffs, the federal government ac
knowledged that consumers were left without remedy for similar
causes of action.71 This led to the modification of the FTCA, which,
in turn, spurred the evolution of the DTPAs within the states. Like
the Lanham Act, these state acts included their own standing re
quirements.72 Ironically, these standing requirements are antitheti
cal to those of the Lanham Act; oftentimes, standing is limited
solely to consumers unless a corporate plaintiff can make some sort
of special evidentiary showing.73 It is these requirements that cre
ate problems for corporate plaintiffs when attempting to bring suit
under the DTPAs.

67. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006). By definition, treble damages are “[d]amages that,
by statute, are three times the amount of actual damages that the fact-finder determines
is owed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (9th ed. 2009). Treble damages are typically
awarded where the state regards the conduct involved to be “particularly reprehensi
ble.” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972). Damages of this kind are almost al
ways considered strictly penal in nature. Dunbar v. Jones, 87 A. 787, 788 (Conn. 1913).
68. GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: VALUA
TION, EXPLOITATION, AND INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES § 42.4, at 726 (2005).
69. Id. This high percentage of damages likely represents the ease with which
one can infringe upon another’s trademark via the Internet. See Baker & McKenzie
Seminar Series on International Litigation and Arbitration, 11 WORLD ARB. & MEDIA
TION REP. 229, 230 (2000), available at 11 WAMREP 229 (Westlaw) (“Due to the In
ternet’s ease of use and low cost in transmitting files globally, intellectual property rules
are being tested when they attempt to adequately protect those who hold . . . trade
marks.”). The number of section 43(a) cases tried in federal courts with monetary dam
ages awarded has likely risen since Smith and Parr’s book was published in 2005.
70. Id. at 729-30.
71. See Burns, supra note 48, at 837-38.
72. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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II. PAVING THE ROAD TO CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE
TRANSITION FROM THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ACT TO STATE DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACTS
Despite the passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,74
companies within the United States continued to grow to epic pro
portions and monopolized industries to such an extent that the leg
islation attempting to cap their power was moot.75 The FTC was
created in 1914 with the passing of the FTCA to curtail such an
ticompetitive practices.76 In its original form, the FTCA was meant
only to ban practices that were detrimental to a competitor’s busi
ness.77 Years later, Congress amended section 5 of the FTCA to
prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com
merce”;78 accordingly, the FTC was granted the power to protect
consumers.79
The standard to bring suit under the FTCA is significantly less
stringent than that of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.80 Currently,
under the FTCA, it is illegal “to ‘disseminate, or cause to be dis
seminated, any false advertisement . . . [which] induc[es], or . . . is
likely to induce . . . the purchase of food, drugs, devices, services, or
cosmetics.’”81 In litigating these claims, the FTC developed the
“reasonable consumer” test82 to control in situations where mate
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
75. Andy J. Miller, Note, A Procedural Approach to “Unfair Methods of Compe
tition,” 93 IOWA L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2008) (quoting DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERI
CANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 418 (1973)). One of the companies in the
forefront of the Sherman Act’s “failure” was Standard Oil, which continued to expand
and grow larger despite the presence of the Sherman Act. Id. Attempting to pass legis
lation against such monolithic companies has been compared to “passing a law against
the wind.” Id. Still, even after Standard Oil had been dissolved, the Sherman Act was
not reformed. Id.
76. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58).
77. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in
Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 11 (2006).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also Jon Mize, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resis
tance: Re-Examining the Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising,
72 TENN. L. REV. 653, 656 (2005).
79. For a general discussion of the FTCA’s legislative history, see Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 990-96 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Scheuerman, supra
note 77, at 12.
80. See Mize, supra note 78, at 654-58.
81. Id. at 656-57 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 52).
82. Under the “reasonable consumer” test, the FTC must not only show that “de
ception was probable” but also that deception would occur to “consumers acting rea
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rial business deceptions are likely to cause injury to a consumer
who “reasonably rel[ies]” on the offending deceptive material.83
Although the FTCA’s provisions are clear, the Act has one
flaw—it lacks a definition for the term “deceptive trade practice.”84
It merely provides several catch-all provisions under which a decep
tive trade practice might occur.85 The FTC is tasked with the en
forcement of these policies and pursues only claims that “would be
to the interest of the public.”86 However, claims brought under the
FTCA do not equip potential plaintiffs—the members of the pub
lic—with a private right of action.87
The FTC was widely criticized throughout the 1950s and 1960s
because it lacked the ability to fully and adequately address the
problems of consumer fraud that the nation faced, particularly due
to its failure to provide a private right of action for plaintiffs.88 In
response, beginning in the early 1960s, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws89 (“NCCUSL”) brought
forth the UDTPA.90 The UDTPA was created in order to delineate
specific deceptive practices that may create a “likelihood of public
deception.”91 The uniform act also expressly provided that corpo
sonably in the circumstances.” Lemley, supra note 26, at 318. The test only applies to
material deceptions that have been reasonably relied upon and are likely to cause injury
to a consumer. Id.
83. Id.; see Karns, supra note 19, at 388.
84. The FTCA states only that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are . . .
declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also Lemley, supra note 26, at 319.
85. Lemley, supra note 26, at 320.
86. 15 U.S.C. §45(b); see Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 442
(1991).
87. Miller, supra note 75, at 1495.
88. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
THE LAW § 8:2 (2008); see also Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in
Consumer Protection: At Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV.
131, 141 (2006).
89. The NCCUSL was created in 1892 with the united goal of bringing uniformity
to the laws of the states. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS SEVENTY-THIRD YEAR 308 (1964). The NCCUSL attempts to bring
about uniformity in the law “by creating potential laws that it then tries to get the states
to adopt.” Travis McDade, Legal Research, A.B.A. STUDENT LAW., Feb. 2009, at 12, 12.
90. See generally UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (amended 1966, with
drawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
91. The UDTPA’s prohibition of deceptive trade practices reads as follows:
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of
his business, vocation, or occupation, he:
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rate entities were entitled to protection under its auspices.92 The
UDTPA was revised in 1966 and provided that the prevailing party
in suit be awarded costs and may receive attorneys’ fees.93
Four years later, the FTC joined forces with the Committee on
Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments to
draft the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(“UTP/CPL”).94 The UTP/CPL provided a private right of action
for consumers, allowing for not only damages with a statutory mini
mum but also for the institution of class actions.95 Not to be out
done, the NCCUSL, with the aid of the American Bar Association,
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association with, or certification by, another;
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in
connection with goods or services;
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, charac
teristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that
a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he
does not have;
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, al
tered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand;
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality,
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of
another;
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or mis
leading representation of fact;
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably ex
pectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of
quantity;
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; or
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding.
Id. § 2; see also Dole, supra note 11, at 486 (explaining that the UDTPA strictly forbade
the substitution of goods, trademark infringement, false designations of origin, false
advertising, disparagement, bait-and-switch advertising, pricing fraud, as well as con
duct tending to create confusion, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings).
92. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 1 (noting in the “Definitions”
section that “[a] ‘person’ means an individual, corporation, government, or governmen
tal subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated asso
ciation, two or more of any of the foregoing having a joint or common interest, or any
other legal or commercial entity” (emphases added)).
93. Id. § 3(b).
94. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 88, § 3:5.
95. See Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law §§ 8(a)-8(b) (sug
gested legislation), in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION 144, 148-49 (1969).
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suggested another model act—the Uniform Consumer Sales Prac
tice Act (“UCSPA”), which applied solely to transactions between
consumers.96 By the early 1970s, the majority of the states had
adopted one form or another of the three proposed uniform mod
els—which came to be known as DTPAs.97
96. JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
ACTS AND PRACTICES § 3.4.2.3 (5th ed. 2001).
97. The UDTPA has been adopted in twelve states, while the UCSPA has been
adopted in four. Rachel S. Kowal, Warranty and the Courts, in PRODUCT WARRANTY
HANDBOOK 97, 116 (Wallace R. Blischke & D. N. Prabhakar Murthy eds., 1996); see
also LII: Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator, http://www.law.cornell.edu/
uniform/vol7.html (last visited May 13, 2010) (providing a table of uniform laws and the
states that have enacted them, including the UDTPA and the UCSPA). The remaining
states have adopted either some form of the UTP/CPL or statutes that prohibit specific
unfair practices. D. Wes Sullenger, Only We Can Save You: When and Why Non-Con
sumer Businesses Have Standing to Sue Business Competitors Under the Tennessee Con
sumer Protection Act, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 485, 492 (2005); see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8
19-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (2008); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 to -1534 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101 to -115 (2001);
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 2009); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-09,
17500-09 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-101 to -115 (West 2001); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110a to -110q (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511
2527, 2531-2536 (2005); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3901 to -3911 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201-.213 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370 to -427 (2009);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-21 to -24, 481A-1 to -5, 481B-1 to -25 (LexisNexis 2009);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601 to -619 (2003); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1 to /12,
510/1 to /7 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-0.5-1 to -12 (West 2005); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 714.16-.16A (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 to -640 (2005); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 367.110-.360 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401-1420
(2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A to 214 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, §§ 1211-1216 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101 to -501 (LexisNexis
2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-11 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.901
.922 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.09-.16, 325D.43-.48 (West 2004); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-1 to -27 (West 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.010-.307 (West
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -143 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-1601 to
-1623 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-301 to -306 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 598.0903-.0999 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.600 (LexisNexis
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1 to -A:13 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to
-91 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -24 (West 2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 63(12) (McKinney 2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349-350 (McKinney 2004); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -42 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-15-01 to -11 (2007); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.13, 4165.01-.04 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 751-763 (West 1993 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 78, §§ 51-55 (West 2001);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605-.656 (2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to -9.3 (West
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 to -28 (2001 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5
10 to -160 (1985 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-24-1 to -40 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101 to -125 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63
(Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-1 to -18, 13-11-1 to -23 (2005); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451-2480n (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (2006); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010-.920 (West 1998 & Supp. 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 46A-6-101 to -110 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18, 100.20-.264 (West
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Unsurprisingly, because each state adopted a different form of
the DTPA, each with different standing requirements, litigation
across the states under these acts is tumultuous at best. Unfortu
nately, in early 2000, the NCCUSL withdrew the best option for
uniformity, the UDTPA.98 The NCCUSL believed that the
UDTPA had been rendered obsolete by virtue of the Lanham Act’s
1988 amendments.99 However, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
designed to have a symbiotic relationship with state law causes of
action, supplementing the DTPAs as opposed to preempting
them.100 In light of this fact, the NCCUSL’s argument for obsoles
cence seems to be moot. But the NCCUSL’s obsolescence argu
ment does give rise to the assertion that this relationship ought to
be evaluated such that DTPA claims are afforded the same level of
scrutiny in favor of corporate competitors as Lanham Act claims.
III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SECTION 43(A) LANHAM ACT
CLAIMS AND STATE DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICE ACT CLAIMS
Because the DTPAs were crafted from the FTCA, they share a
special relationship with section 43(a) of the Lanham Act—they are
supposed to work together as opposed to separately.101 The origi
nal purpose of both the Lanham Act and the DTPAs was the pro
tection of business against undue competition and interference.102
It is often the case in false-advertising claims between corporate
2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-101 to -114 (2009); see also Scheuerman, supra note
77, at 18-19.
98. Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State “Laborato
ries” and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKE
LEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1392 (2005). The NCCUSL, which houses its archives at the
University of Pennsylvania’s Biddle Law Library, no longer maintains viable records
regarding the UDTPA. See Penn Law—Biddle Law Library Archives: NCCUSL
Drafts and Final Acts, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited
May 10, 2010) (detailing more than four dozen model acts but specifically excluding the
UDTPA).
99. See generally Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102
Stat. 3935.
100. Lemley, supra note 26, at 312-13.
101. Id. at 327.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The intent of this chapter is . . . to protect
persons engaged in [ ] commerce against unfair competition.”); UNIF. DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A.
265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/
rudtpa66.pdf (stating that the UDTPA was created in the hopes of stopping
“[d]eceptive conduct constituting unreasonable interference with another’s promotion
and conduct of business”).
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competitors that one corporate entity has infringed upon the
other’s trademark.103 In these cases, there may only be a federal
remedy, in part because competitors are granted standing under the
Lanham Act but not under all of the DTPAs. There can be no state
remedy where the corporate competitor lacks standing in the state
forum, and the absence of a state remedy can lead to irreparable
harm to the corporation’s reputation in the local marketplace.104
With the onset of the “heyday of consumerism,” state legisla
tors were eager to provide their constituents with a means of pro
tecting themselves against unfair and deceptive trade practices.105
Several policy considerations underlay the adoption of the DTPAs.
First and foremost, there existed and still remains a great difference
in bargaining power in the marketplace between consumers and
merchants.106 With the advancing corporate markets of the 1970s
and 1980s, the doctrine of caveat emptor could no longer be applied
because transactions were no longer made at arm’s length.107 This
concept continues to prevail, especially in today’s age of
technology.
An equally important consideration in the adoption of the
DTPAs was deterrence of future harm against the consuming pub
103. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1992)
(“Trademark infringers inflict injury not only on their competitors, . . . but they also
inflict pervasive injuries on consumers.”).
104. Attorney Garrett J. Waltzer gave voice to these concerns in a Comment writ
ten for the UCLA Law Review, stating,
Because consumers are mostly incapable of distinguishing between the in
fringed product and the infringing product, any customer dissatisfaction result
ing from inferior products bearing a false trademark detrimentally affects the
reputation of the target of the infringement. Thus, [competitors who are] vic
tims of trademark infringement [through false advertising] suffer additional
injury to their reputations.
Garrett J. Waltzer, Comment, Monetary Relief for False Advertising Claims Arising
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 34 UCLA L. REV. 953, 971 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
105. J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law:
Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 347 (1992);
see also Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance:
The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 57 CON
SUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 60, 60-61 (2003).
106. Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal to Ex
tend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1625-26 (1983).
107. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J.
1133 (1931) (discussing the origins and past development of the doctrine of caveat
emptor); see also Olha N.M. Rybakoff, An Overview of Consumer Protection and Fair
Trade Regulation in Delaware, 8 DEL. L. REV. 63, 64-66 (2005) (discussing the modern
evolution of the doctrine of caveat emptor).
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lic.108 With a private right of action available, merchants seeking to
defraud their customers would be on guard for fear that their lessthan-pristine actions might result in a lawsuit.109 In effect, consum
ers would gain not only the power of self-vindication but also the
charge of becoming watchdogs in the marketplace.110
The DTPAs are composed of language lifted directly from ei
ther the FTCA or the provisions of the UDTPA, UTP/CPL, and the
UCSPA,111 thus earning the nickname “Little FTC Acts.”112 Un
like their federal counterpart, the DTPAs offer damages to their
consumer-plaintiffs in various forms, including, but not limited to,
treble damages,113 other punitive damages, statutory minimum
damages, and attorneys’ fees.114 Although due consideration has
been given to the potential bonuses that may be afforded to plain
tiffs bringing suit under the DTPAs, an evaluation of the DTPAs
would not be complete without acknowledging what these statutes
are missing.
A. What Is a “Deceptive Trade Practice”?
The DTPAs and the FTCA share a common feature: they both
lack a concrete definition of “deceptive trade practices.”115 How
ever, this ambiguity may well have been deliberate—it has been
suggested that legislators feared that the inclusion of more specific
language might fail to protect consumers against future, unforesee
able deceptive practices;116 foreclose future avenues of litigation;
108. Note, supra note 106, at 1626.
109. The House of Representatives noted that “[i]f deterrence is to be effective,
the enforcement initiative must come from the private sector.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-1008,
pt. 1, at 5 (1980).
110. Note, supra note 106, at 1626.
111. Karns, supra note 19, at 375-76.
112. The term “Little FTC Acts” refers to consumer-protection statutes whose
provisions are based upon the FTCA. Note, supra note 106, at 1622 n.5.
113. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West 2007) (allowing for
award of punitive damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (instituting treble
damages); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004) (instituting statutory minimum
damages); see also Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or
Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 130 (1987) (“All of those states that have
private rights of action now have provisions for attorneys’ fees.”).
115. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV.
657, 658 (1985) (acknowledging that a consensus has yet to have been reached as to the
definition of a “deceptive trade practice”); see also Lemley, supra note 26, at 319-20.
116. Lee Ann Bundren, State Consumer Fraud Legislation Applied to the Health
Care Industry, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 138 (1995).
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and defeat the statute’s original purpose117: to prohibit conduct that
would likely cause confusion in the marketplace.118
Akin to section 43(a) Lanham Act actions, DTPAs also have
mandatory standing requirements. The vast majority of states with
DTPAs define potential plaintiffs as either “a person” or “a con
sumer.”119 Section 43(a)’s standing requirements and the DTPAs’
standing requirements are on the opposite sides of the same coin.
While section 43(a)’s “any person”120 provision has been restricted
to allow only corporate competitors to bring suit,121 the DTPAs’
“any person”122 provision has been taken to exclude or restrict
availability of remedy to corporate competitors in most cases.123 To
determine if a corporate competitor may bring suit under a DTPA,
one must look not only to the statutory definitions involved but also
to the particular injury alleged.124 To perform this inquiry, Parts
117. HEALTH LAW DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N, E-HEALTH BUSINESS AND TRANSAC
LAW 106 (Barbara Bennett ed., 2002). At the time the DTPAs were first writ
ten, the drafters could not foresee the advent of the technology age and the inception of
the Internet. Id. These innovations are unique to our time, and no one could have
anticipated their creation, much less the unparalleled illegalities they would have the
potential to harbor.
118. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(12) (amended 1966, with
drawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 280 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf; see also Dole, supra note 11, at 486. Many courts in
the northeastern United States have all but ruled out the validity of the prime cause of
such effects—trademark infringement. See Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07
Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (“‘[T]rademark
cases are outside the scope of [New York’s] consumer protection statute.’” (quoting
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 2002))). This premise will be discussed further in Part IV of this Note. See
infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
119. For example, the DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York each
describe injured parties as “any person.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2008); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h); see Flynn & Slater, supra note
105, at 63.
120. See De Sevo, supra note 48, at 2-3, 8. These questions of ability to bring suit
boil down to the federal courts’ adherence to prudential standing limitations, which are
“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Apgar, supra
note 48, at 2394 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993); Colligan v.
Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971).
122. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 63.
123. Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Do Businesses Have Standing to Sue Under State
Consumer Fraud Statutes?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 385, 386-87 (1996).
124. Id. at 386. Although this Note focuses upon the states within the First, Sec
ond, and Third Federal Circuits (Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and Ver
mont), in the interest of brevity, only one state from each circuit will be discussed at
length.
TIONAL
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III.A.1-3 of this Note will explore the DTPAs of one state from
each of the First, Second, and Third Circuits—specifically, Massa
chusetts, New York, and New Jersey.
1. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts DTPA, chapter 93A of the Massachusetts
General Laws,125 was amended in 1972 to address “unfair or decep
tive act[s] or practice[s]” between corporate competitors.126 To
mount a successful suit against a competitor, a corporate plaintiff
must prove that the corporate defendant acted with “rascality.”127
The rascality test is a difficult threshold to meet and oftentimes re
quires the corporate defendant to act as “a ‘jackal,’ guilty of ‘mani
fest . . . rascality.’”128 In addition to the strict rascality requirement,
to bring suit under the Massachusetts DTPA, corporate competitors
must prove that the alleged unfair or deceptive act is not a common
business practice.129 In light of these requirements, corporate
plaintiffs under the Massachusetts act must claim that the defen
dant’s behavior had a “rancid flavor of unfairness” to invoke 93A
protection.130
Massachusetts’s DTPA limits a corporate plaintiff’s ability to
bring a trademark suit against a competitor. In McKernan v. Burek,
the plaintiff and the defendant were corporate competitors in the
business of manufacturing novelty stickers.131 The plaintiff claimed
that the defendant copied his sticker and then attempted to sell it as
if it were the defendant’s own.132 The district court found that the
plaintiff’s trademark infringement claims ultimately failed because
the trademark in question was not inherently distinctive.133 Fur
thermore, the court noted that had those claims been actionable
under law, it is likely that judgment would still have been rendered
for the defendant because the plaintiff would have been required to
125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2008).
126. Id. § 11.
127. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The
objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of
someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.”). Rascality is
defined as of or relating to a rascal, that is, “a mean, unprincipled, or dishonest person.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1031 (11th ed. 2005).
128. Atl. Cement Co. v. S. Shore Bank, 730 F.2d 831, 834 (1st Cir. 1984) (omis
sion in original).
129. Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 80, 88 (Mass. 1983).
130. Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 598 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
131. McKernan v. Burek, 118 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D. Mass. 2000).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 124.
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prove the appropriate level of “rascality” as well as an actual
loss.134
2. New York
In contrast, to have standing under the New York DTPA, a
corporation need only demonstrate that its competitor’s action has
had some effect on the public at large.135 The New York DTPA,
New York General Business Law section 349, declares unlawful
“deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce . . . in the furnishing of any service in [the] state”136 and
allows “any person who has been injured by reason of [such] viola
tion” to bring suit.137 An act is deceptive within the meaning of the
New York DTPA only if it is “likely to mislead a reasonable con
sumer.”138 In providing that actions may be brought by “any per
son”139 so injured, it appears that the legislators responsible for
drafting the Act did not contemplate a proviso that limits potential
plaintiffs solely to “consumers.”140 To bring forth a successful
claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s consumeroriented acts were misleading in a material way such that the plain
tiff was injured as a result.141 In applying the New York DTPA to
suits between corporate competitors, the courts have read in a
“public interest requirement.”142 Specifically, “some harm to the
public at large [must be] at issue.”143 Where the underpinning of
134. Id. at 125-26.
135. Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995);
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
In examining claims made between corporate competitors, the courts have stated on
multiple occasions that “the gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or
harm to the public interest.” Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785
(PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (quoting Gucci Am., Inc., 277
F. Supp. 2d at 273) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2004).
137. Id. § 349(h).
138. Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Maurizo v. Gold
smith, 230 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000)).
139. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h).
140. Joseph Thomas Moldovan, New York Creates a Private Right of Action to
Combat Consumer Fraud: Caveat Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 509, 525-26 (1982).
“Businessmen . . . are victimized by deceptive and fraudulent business practices and
suffer from the unethical conduct of their competitors. Inasmuch as one of the main
purposes of the Act is to deter the commission of such practices, . . . it is imperative that
those with the greatest financial means available . . . bring suit.” Id. at 527 n.67.
141. Maurizio, 230 F.3d at 521; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277
F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
142. Moldovan, supra note 140, at 529.
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

R
R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE306.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 23

DECEPTION IS A CRUEL ACT

18-JUN-10

12:58

571

the complaint demonstrates only harm to another business, courts
have routinely rejected corporate competitors’ claims made under
section 349.144
Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc. 145 is the leading case in
New York regarding corporate competitor claims made under the
DTPA. Karam Prasad arose out of an action for trademark in
fringement after it was discovered that the defendant’s retail chain
had appropriated a crystalline logo from the plaintiff’s high-end
brand of designer jeans.146 In addition to its federal trademark
claim, the plaintiff claimed that the infringement constituted a vio
lation of New York’s DTPA.147 The plaintiff’s DTPA claim never
made it to trial because the defendant filed a motion to dismiss as
to that particular cause of action, the motion stating that the plain
tiff had not “sufficiently alleged a harm to the public interest.”148
The district court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of ac
tion under the DTPA.149 The court noted that “trademark infringe
ment actions alleging only general consumer confusion do not
threaten the direct harm to consumers that is required to state a
claim under Section 349.”150 Interestingly, however, the Karam
Prasad case created a split within the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York.151
Five years earlier, in GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., the
district court found that the defendant had engaged in a deceptive
act through its intentional use of the plaintiff’s mark.152 Here, the
plaintiff was the master licensee for the successful “FUBU” fashion
brand.153 The plaintiff had launched a lucrative men’s campaign us
ing the number “05.”154 The defendant began to sell similarly de
144. See, e.g., Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 96
Civ. 5150, 1997 WL 137443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997); Winner Int’l v. Kryptonite
Corp., No. 95 Civ. 247, 1996 WL 84476, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996); Fashion Bou
tique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4544, 1992 WL 170559, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1992). The majority of these cases address the issue of trademark
infringement in concert with false advertising of the plaintiff corporation’s products.
145. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL
2438396 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007).
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *2.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No.
96 Civ. 5150, 1997 WL 127443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997)).
151. Id.
152. GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
153. Id. at 279.
154. Id.
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signed men’s clothing using plaintiff’s “05” mark.155 The district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and concluded that because the
defendant had caused actual consumer confusion through its appro
priation of the plaintiff’s mark, it had engaged in a deceptive trade
practice.156 While this case was litigated only five years earlier,
GTFM is at complete odds with Karam Prasad.
3. New Jersey
Although New Jersey is in New York’s backyard, its laws con
cerning deceptive trade practices are completely different. Under
the New Jersey DTPA, “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable
loss of moneys or property, real or personal,”157 has standing if that
person has suffered the loss through “any unconscionable commer
cial practice,158 deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, mis
representation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or
omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale
or advertisement of any merchandise [or services].”159 The New
Jersey DTPA is designed “to protect consumers who purchase
‘goods or services generally sold to the public at large.’”160 Accord
ingly, to bring suit under the New Jersey DTPA, a corporate plain
tiff must prove that it was acting as a consumer purchasing “‘goods
. . . sold to the public at large’” in the transaction in question.161
“[T]he mere fact that a corporation purchases the goods for use in
155. Id. at 284.
156. Id. at 302.
157. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (stating that “any person who suffers
any ascertainable loss . . . may bring an action or assert a counterclaim”); see Cox v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 463-64 (1994) (noting that plaintiffs are entitled to
treble damages only if they can prove an ascertainable loss).
158. In Kugler v. Romain, the New Jersey Supreme Court defined the phrase “un
conscionable commercial practices” as “an amorphous concept obviously designed to
establish a broad business ethic . . . [implying a lack of] good faith, honesty in fact and
observance of fair dealing.” Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651-52 (N.J. 1971).
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2. For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of the
New Jersey DTPA, see Lisa J. Trembly & Michael F. Bevacqua, Back to the Future with
the Consumer Fraud Act: New Jersey Sets the Standard for Consumer Protection, 29
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 193 (2004).
160. Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone Card Co., 756 A.2d 636, 637-38 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (quoting Marascio v. Campanella, 689 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)). The New Jersey DTPA has been construed to afford pro
tection to both corporate and commercial entities that “purchase goods and services for
use in their business operations.” Id. at 638.
161. Id. at 637-38 (quoting Marascio, 689 A.2d at 857).
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its business does not preclude invocation of the [New Jersey DTPA]
and its regulations.”162
While some state laws give varying measures of relief for such
conduct, general reliance on state protection has led to inconsis
tency and unpredictability as well as to important gaps in protec
tion.163 As has been shown, in Massachusetts, New York, and New
Jersey—neighboring states in the First, Second, and Third Circuits,
respectively—what is required of a corporate plaintiff to bring suit
differs tremendously among the three. Inconsistencies in the law
would be abundant if a corporate plaintiff were to litigate a DTPA
claim among these three states. It is alarming to think about the
financial hardship that a corporate entity would incur if it had to
litigate DTPA claims in all eleven states that compose the First,
Second, and Third Circuits, let alone the rest of the states across the
country. To remedy this unique problem and avoid legal chaos,
something must be done.
IV. PROTECTING CORPORATE COMPETITORS: THE ARGUMENT
FOR TRANSFORMING THE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACTS
TO ACCOMMODATE BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
The special relationship between the Lanham Act and the
FTCA,164 both originally created in order to protect business com
petitors,165 yielded the inception of the DTPAs.166 Surprisingly,
most of the DTPAs do not afford the same consideration to corpo
rate entities as was originally intended by the model acts.167 Often,
corporate competitors are denied the right to bring suit under the
DTPAs in the Northeast,168 especially in trademark infringement
162. Marascio, 689 A.2d at 857. For the purposes of the New Jersey DTPA, mer
chandise, or, in other words, goods sold to the public at large, is defined as “any objects,
wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the
public for sale.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c).
163. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 65.
164. Both the Lanham Act and the FTCA address deceptiveness via means of
false advertising and other unfair trade practices, seeking to prohibit “unfair or decep
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); see also
Wrona, supra note 4, at 1091-92.
165. See Scheuerman, supra note 77, at 11.
166. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1212 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 201-3 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956, §§ 6-13.1-2, 6-13.1-5 (2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (2006).
168. See statutes cited supra note 167.
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actions.169 If corporate competitors are allowed to file suit under
the DTPAs at all, it is often with rigid restrictions.170 In fact, in
most states in the Northeast, trademark infringement actions aris
ing out of false advertising between corporate competitors are all
but precluded from litigation under state law.171
The DTPAs ought to provide corporate competitors the same
sort of protection and uniformity that federal legislation such as the
Lanham Act affords.172 The lack of uniformity present within the
DTPAs has led not only to a dearth of successful litigation on the
part of corporate plaintiffs but also to an intracircuit split, predomi
nantly in cases involving trademarks.173 To remedy these issues, it
is necessary for state legislative bodies to reconsider the current
DTPAs in favor of a new system. Ideally, a new system would en
able corporate competitors to stand in the much-favored shoes of
the consumer plaintiff and to succeed on their claims, even across
state lines.174
169. See, e.g., Winner Int’l v. Kryptonite Corp., No. 95 Civ. 247, 1996 WL 84476,
at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996); EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp.
128, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F.
Supp. 182, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Arbel Corp., No. 86 Civ. 6801,
1989 WL 125781, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1989).
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A,
§§ 2, 11 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19
(West 2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004).
171. It is the author’s opinion that the judicial interpretation of this issue paints a
poor picture of corporations. The motivation behind each and every corporate entity’s
suit is not necessarily driven by financial reasons—conversely, consumer opinion plays
a very strong role in the equation. Robert C. Bird, Assistant Professor of Marketing
and Law at the University of Connecticut, School of Business, notes that “[c]onsumer
perceptions of market information are critically important . . . . For example, when a
brand owner sues a rival to stop trademark infringement, harm to the brand owner is
not the main focus . . . . [I]t is proof that . . . consumers will be likely to confused [sic]
between the established and the challenged mark . . . .” Robert C. Bird, The Impact of
Legal Standing Rules on Deceptive and Legitimate Advertising Activity 19 (Apr. 1,
2008) (unpublished working paper, on file with the University of Connecti
cut–Department of Marketing), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123676.
172. Glen E. Weston, Trademarks and Unfair Competition by J. Thomas McCar
thy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 143, 150-51 (1985) (book review) (“The little FTC Acts . . .
may be sleeping giants with the potential to become major remedies against almost any
type of unfair competition involving consumer transactions.”).
173. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 65; Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No.
07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (“[T]here is a
split in this Circuit regarding infringement claims under [New York’s DTPA].”).
174. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 67 (“Effective consumer protection in the
Twenty-First Century will mean that consumers and businesses increasingly will need to
be treated alike.”).
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Part IV of this Note will examine the origins and various judi
cial interpretations of the DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and New York, in terms of their rocky relationships with—and oftadverse attitudes towards—corporate competitors. In particular,
special attention will be paid to the judicial conflict involving New
York’s DTPA due to the intracircuit split that has arisen as a result
of differing interpretations of the statute. Because of the discord
among the courts on the issue of whether corporate competitors
may bring trademark infringement actions under the DTPAs, it has
become obvious that some sort of solution to this problem must be
reached. Part IV will introduce a workable revision of the UDTPA
that, if adopted, would bring much-needed equality to the north
eastern United States with regard to the status of corporate com
petitors’ ability to bring trademark actions under DTPAs.
A. Looking to the Past to Gain Understanding for the Future:
Interpretation of the DTPAs
To understand the DTPAs and their resistance to offering cor
porate competitors the same protections as they would the ordinary
consumer, one must consider their statutory language, their legisla
tive history, and the case law that further interprets them. The Su
preme Court has stated that “the starting point for interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly ex
pressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must or
dinarily be regarded as conclusive.”175 Accordingly, an analysis of
the DTPAs’ applicability to corporate competitors must begin with
the language of the statutes themselves.
1. The Plain Language of Each Statute Does Not Exclude
Corporate Competitors
The DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York each
provide in their plain language that “any person” that has been
damaged by a deceptive trade practice may bring suit for their inju
ries.176 For the purposes of the Massachusetts DTPA, the term
175. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2008) (stating that “[a]ny person who en
gages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers any loss . . . as a result
of . . . an unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . may . . . bring an action . . . for
damages”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (stating that “[a]ny person who suf
fers any ascertainable loss . . . as a result of the use . . . of any . . . practice declared
unlawful under this act . . . may bring an action . . . in any court of competent jurisdic
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“person” includes “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partner
ships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other
legal entity.”177 The New Jersey DTPA’s definition of “person” is
similar and includes “any natural person or his legal representative,
partnership, corporation, company, trust, business entity or associa
tion.”178 Thus, the plain language of both the Massachusetts and
New Jersey DTPAs requires only that the plaintiff be a person who
has suffered an injury due to the deceptive trade practice of the
defendant.179 Nothing in the language of the statutes requires the
plaintiff to be a consumer or that a consumer be injured by a decep
tive trade practice to bring suit.
Although New York’s DTPA does not provide a definition for
the term “person,” guidance is provided by New York’s Rules of
Construction, which state that “statutory language is generally con
strued according to its natural and most obvious sense, without
resorting to an artificial or forced construction.”180 In terms of New
York’s DTPA, courts have observed that the definition of the word
“person,” in its most obvious sense, deals with more than just natu
ral persons,181 since the DTPA deals with “the conduct of any busi
ness, trade or commerce.”182 Accordingly, the term “person” under
New York’s statute may be considered to mean natural persons or
business entities entitled to the same rights as natural persons.183
Thus, like the DTPAs of Massachusetts and New Jersey, New
York’s statute requires nothing more from a plaintiff than a show
ing that the injury claimed has been caused by a deceptive trade
practice.

tion”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2004) (stating that “any person who
has been injured by reason of any violation of this section may bring an action . . . to
enjoin such unlawful act or practice [or] an action to recover his actual damages”).
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1 (emphasis added).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(d) (emphasis added).
179. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19.
180. N.Y. STAT. § 94 (1971).
181. “[A]s a threshold matter, plaintiffs [may] claim[ ] the benefit of section
349—whether individuals or entities . . . .” Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund
v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) (emphasis added).
182. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a).
183. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “person” as a “human being . . . . [or] natu
ral person” and “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having
most of the rights and duties of a human being.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th
ed. 2009).
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2. The Legislative Histories of the Statutes Supports the
Inclusion of Corporate Competitors Within the
Scope of Their Protection
Although the statutory language of the DTPAs appears to be
plain in terms of the right of corporate competitors to bring suit, the
statutes have been subject to a host of interpretations regarding
whether corporate competitors ought to be afforded the right to
bring trademark infringement actions. To reconcile these issues, it
then becomes necessary to look to the intent of the state legisla
tures in order to determine the correct interpretation.184 Legisla
tive intent can be culled from the legislature’s history leading up to
the enactment of the statute at issue.185 If legislative intent war
ranting the ability of corporate competitors to bring suit under the
DTPAs is found, case law interpreting that intent may dictate
whether those competitors may bring trademark actions.
To discuss the legislative intent of the DTPAs of Massachu
setts, New Jersey, or New York, one must look to the legislative
history of the FTCA. All three statutes are based, in part, upon this
federal act, and all three claim in construing their statements on
deceptive trade practices that it was the intent of their individual
state legislatures to follow the guidance provided by, and interpre
tations of, section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA.186
The original legislative mandate of the FTCA was to “inhibit
restraints against trade and protect business from the unfair trade
practices of their competitors.”187 In 1938, however, Congress
passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the 1914 version of the
184. “Consideration of the ‘specific history of the legislative process that
culminated in the [statute at issue] affords . . . solid ground for giving it appropriate
meaning’ and for resolving ambiguity present” in interpretation. YULE KIM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS 42 (2008) (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
222 (1952)), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
185. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 10 (2003).
186. Section 45(a)(1) of the FTCA states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com
merce, are hereby declared unlawful.” Id. § 45(a)(1). For example, the rules and regu
lations section of the Massachusetts DTPA states, in relevant part, that “[i]t is the intent
of the legislature that in construing . . . [the Act], the courts will be guided by the
interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to sec
tion 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2
(2008).
187. JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LE
GAL CONCEPT 9 (1990).
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FTCA,188 which allowed the FTC to extend its reach to the protec
tion of not only businesses but consumers as well.189 The purpose
of the FTCA, then, is to “preserve, for the benefit of the public,
active competition” in the marketplace.190 In order to maintain the
sort of “active competition” in the marketplace that is desired by
the FTCA, trademarks and other varieties of intellectual property
must be protected.191
The fact that the DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
New York all purport to stand in the shadow of the FTCA in terms
of interpretation of deceptive acts bodes well for corporate compet
itors seeking to bring suit under the DTPAs,192 largely because the
DTPAs are applied to “matters affecting the consumer public at
large.”193 The maintenance of active competition in the market
place certainly affects the consumer public at large.194 And, with
out corporate competitors, there would be no marketplace at all.
To achieve this goal, the DTPAs must be read broadly to remain
consistent with their drafters’ wishes.195 Such a reading will afford
protection to corporate competitors.
188. Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-14 (1938) (amending 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1934)).
189. “[T]he Commission could thenceforth prevent unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce which injuriously affected the public interest alone . . . .” Scien
tific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1941).
190. FTC v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1932).
191. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Home Utils. Co., 131 F. Supp. 838, 839 (D. Md. 1955).
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(b) (2008) (“It is the intent of the legislature
that . . . the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(d) (McKinney 2004) (“In any such action it shall be
a complete defense that the act or practice is . . . subject to and complies with the rules
and regulations of, and the statutes administered by, the federal trade commission.”);
see also State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. Colo. State Christian Coll. of Church of Inner Power,
Inc., 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
193. Kirk v. Heppt, 532 F. Supp. 2d 586, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
194. Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Inst. Servs., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005) (“The Legislature originally enacted c. 93A to improve the commercial
relationship between consumers and businessmen. By requiring proper disclosure of
relevant information and proscribing unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the Legisla
ture strove to encourage more equitable behavior in the marketplace.”).
195. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53, 66 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“[C]h. 93A provides a broad remedy.”); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK
STATE ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION, A PROPOSED NEW STATE LAW MAKING DECEPTIVE ACTS OR
PRACTICES UNLAWFUL (1968), reprinted in 1968 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP.
114, 129 (1968).
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3. Legal Chaos: Examination of Case Law in the Northeast
to Determine Competitors’ Rights in Trademark
Infringement Actions
As both the plain meaning and legislative intent of the DTPAs
indicate that corporate competitors have a right to protection, it is
necessary to evaluate the attendant case law on the topic to deter
mine whether, if at all, corporate competitors ought to be afforded
the right to bring trademark infringement actions under these stat
utes. Case law from Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York in
dicates that although there does seem to be a way for corporate
competitors to make trademark infringement claims under the
DTPAs, there is a great discrepancy between the various statutes.
As it stands, each state requires a plaintiff to prove different ele
ments of a deceptive-trade-practice claim.196
As opposed to working together harmoniously, the DTPAs of
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York exist in antinomy. It is
almost impossible to compare the statutes due to the many different
judicial interpretations. For example, the successful trademark in
fringement plaintiff under New York’s GTFM standard,197 who is
able to prove that the corporate defendant’s consumer-oriented ac
tions were so materially misleading that the plaintiff was damaged
as a result,198 would fail under the same basis in Massachusetts for
want of the requisite level of “rascality.”199 Similarly, while a suc
cessful corporate plaintiff in New Jersey may be able to win its
trademark case by proving it was acting as a consumer in the trans
action in question and that it suffered an ascertainable loss,200 that
same action would most certainly fail in New York under the stan
dard set in Karam Prasad 201 for a lack of harm to the public
interest.202
The inequities present in the DTPAs of just three states in the
northeastern United States produce questionable results when at
tempting to move across state lines. It is overwhelming to ponder
196. See supra notes 125-163 and accompanying text.
197. GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
198. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
199. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1979).
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001); Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone
Card Co., 756 A.2d 636, 637-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
201. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL
2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007).
202. Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995);
Gucci Am., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 273.

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE306.txt

580

unknown

Seq: 32

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

18-JUN-10

12:58

[Vol. 32:549

what would occur if a large business were to find itself in the unfor
tunate position of having to bring an infringement action under a
DTPA in all fifty states due to widespread appropriation of its
mark.203 To avoid that sort of a situation, the standing require
ments of DTPA laws must change.
B. Leveling the Playing Field—The Readoption of a True
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
With NCCUSL’s withdrawal of the UDTPA, the American Bar
Association’s “goal of creating ‘uniformity in the law of unfair com
petition among the respective states’ through adoption of a uniform
state law” has yet to be fulfilled.204 There can be no uniformity in
the law when an entire class of potential plaintiffs is excluded from
the possibility of litigation that is solely dependent upon the state in
which they reside.205 There appears to be no rhyme or reason to
the DTPAs’ “restricting their coverage to individual consumers.”206
Consumers, however, are not the only ones affected by deceptive
trade practices in the marketplace.207 Both large corporations and
small businesses encounter these legal issues, often due to trade
mark infringement arising out of false advertising by competing
commercial venues. There is a need for consuming businesses and
corporate competitors alike to have an avenue of recourse in such
situations. Perhaps the NCCUSL found the UDTPA to be obsolete
in 2000, when the economy was booming prior to President Clin
203. “[Uniform laws] are like the interstate highway system. The less different
the rules of the road are from one state to the next, the easier it will be for people to
travel.” McDade, supra note 89, at 12. To continue with the interstate highway analogy, the current DTPAs act as roadblocks and checkpoints, making it incredibly diffi
cult for the competitor-plaintiff to travel across state lines.
204. Menell, supra note 98, at 1392 (quoting UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf); see also
Note, supra note 106, at 1640 (“[P]rotecting and promoting . . . businesses is an important American policy goal.”).
205. Some might argue that the DTPAs’ gross exclusion of business entities from
protection does represent a form of uniformity. However, the DTPAs are so vastly
different from state to state that such an argument would not be viable. Even in states
where corporate plaintiffs are restricted from bringing suit under the DTPAs, the statu
tory language that ostracizes those commercial institutions is dissimilar.
206. Note, supra note 106, at 1626-27.
207. An early FTC case exemplifies this concept, noting that “[l]aws are made to
protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.” FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U.S.
112, 116 (1937). Although business entities may be deemed experts in the field, pur
portedly transacting at arm’s length, the author acknowledges that this is not always the
case and believes that “suspicious” corporate competitors are just as worthy of the pro
tection of the laws as their “trusting” consumer counterparts.

R
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ton’s exit from office,208 but in today’s economy, there is a greater
need to protect our businesses from further financial losses.
Although it could be argued that large corporations have no
place in the DTPA framework because of their status as established
businesses,209 this same bone of contention does not apply to the
Northeast’s small businesses. Not all victims of wrongdoing in busi
ness are consumers—it is all too often the case that small businesses
are preyed upon by larger, more experienced companies. In addi
tion, large corporations are apt to become overwhelmed with legal
issues regarding the deceptive use of their famous trademarks by
their similarly situated corporate competitors. Because of the lack
of similarity in the DTPAs, it is nearly impossible for a corporation
in the Northeast to protect itself from potentially devastating at
tacks of false advertising through trademark infringement and un
fair trade practices.
As of 2003, approximately “[t]wenty-one million Americans
[were] engaged in some kind of entrepreneurial activity.”210 How
ever, owners and operators of small businesses are often “inexperi
enced entrepreneurs”211 with little to no business knowledge—
effectively putting their business entities in the same shoes as the
“trusting” consumer in the marketplace.212 Due to their lack of ex
perience in the industry, small businesses may not have the ability
to transact at arm’s length with their vendors or their customers.213
Furthermore, unlike large, perhaps famous, corporations, small
businesses may not have the financial means necessary to litigate
against a business competitor.214 It is indeed true that “small busi
nesses are ‘revolutionizing the business of business,’”215 because
208. Associated Press, Booming Economy of Clinton Years May Cost Bush,
PRESS ATL. CITY, Dec. 25, 2000, at A9, available at 2000 WLNR 7516503 (“Whatever
else is said about President Clinton’s stewardship over the past eight years, one fact is
indisputable: He presided over one of the most remarkable periods of prosperity in the
nation’s history.”).
209. Note, supra note 106, at 1627.
210. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 61.
211. Note, supra note 106, at 1629.
212. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
213. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 151-52 (2005) (“[G]iven the importance of small businesses to the American econ
omy in general, the unavailability of remedial . . . doctrines to such entities may have
real and significant negative impacts upon economic activity.”).
214. Note, supra note 106, at 1629.
215. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 61 (quoting OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS EXPANSIONS IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 2
(2000), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/e_comm2.pdf).
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the laws must adapt to the emergence of these new “consumers”
(or, rather, be carried out as they were intended).216
In an effort to provide a legal remedy to corporate competitors
across state lines, the NCCUSL must reconvene to discuss a possi
ble reenactment of the UDTPA217 with the following reforms: (1)
clear guidelines as to standing requirements for business plaintiffs;
(2) revised terms for what a competitor-plaintiff must prove in or
der to succeed on its claim;218 and (3) a final, concise definition of
what constitutes a “deceptive trade practice.”219 To achieve this
goal, the NCCUSL might look to several states within the North
east with viable DTPAs in practice.
1. Standing Requirements of a Revised UDTPA
As discussed above, the UDTPA defines a “person” as “an in
dividual, corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated as
sociation, two or more of any of the foregoing having a joint or
216. In order to accommodate these new “consumers,” the law must recognize
that “[s]mall businesses are an integral part of the country’s social and economic fabric.
Americans have long championed the essential role that so-called ‘mom-and-pop’
stores play in promoting our society’s basic values and in our economy.” Chad Mout
ray, Looking Ahead: Opportunities and Challenges for Entrepreneurship and Small Bus
iness Owners, 31 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 763, 779 (2009).
217. Better still, Congress could adopt an across-the-board federal rule on decep
tive trade practices, as “the need for uniformity is great.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266
(1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa
66.pdf. In fact, a federal rule would serve the country greatly, since “[t]he sad fate of
most uniform laws . . . [is that] fewer than half have been fully adopted by more than 20
jurisdictions.” McDade, supra note 89, at 13. The problem with the DTPAs is that they
have adopted the UDTPA in piecemeal form. Professor McDade’s article even goes so
far as to tout that “[u]niform laws aren’t always uniform or law.” Id. at 12. Federal
legislation other than the FTCA concerning deceptive trade practices would be a cor
nerstone of this area of the law. However, this seems an unlikely course, since “Con
gress has not responded to the request for federal uniformity . . . .” UNIF. DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note.
218. For example, in order to mount a successful suit against a competitor in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a corporate plaintiff must prove that the corporate
defendant acted with “rascality.” Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149,
153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (“The objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality
that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of
commerce.”). The “rascality” standard would serve as an excellent addition to a revised
UDTPA because it would lend some guidance as to the level of deception a defendant
must rise to in order to be found in violation of the act.
219. The UDTPA, as it stood at the time of its withdrawal in 2000, did not pro
vide a succinct definition for “deceptive trade practice.” Instead, the UDTPA included
twelve catch-all provisions detailing what kinds of activities might amount to a “decep
tive trade practice.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2.

R
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common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity.”220
Moreover, the UDTPA incorporates within its provisions a section
detailing which practices carried out “in the course of . . . business”
would amount to a deceptive trade practice.221 Included in this sec
tion is a subsection pertaining to business-disparagement claims,
which states, in relevant part, that “a person engages in a deceptive
trade practice when, in the course of . . . business, . . . he . . . dispar
ages the goods, services, or business of another by false or mislead
ing representation of fact.”222 The comment on this subsection
acknowledges that the NCCUSL’s decision to include section
2(a)(8) of the UDTPA reflected the courts’ growing trend of con
sidering business disparagement claims.223 When read together, it
certainly seems that the UDTPA intended to afford protection to
corporate competitors. If, under the UDTPA, a “person” can be a
corporation, and that corporation engages in a deceptive act when
disparaging the business “of another,”224 it follows that the NC
CUSL’s inclusion of the “of another” language was for the purpose
of allowing corporate competitors to bring suit.
The majority of the states in the Northeast, however, have
taken a diametric reading of the DTPAs currently enacted, to the
point of excluding or limiting corporate competitors from bringing
suit.225 This conflict of opinions relates back to the debate concern
ing the standing requirements of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.226 There, in order to reach a consensus as to the standing re
quirements necessary to bring suit under the federal act, the courts
have looked to Congress’s intent in crafting the Act—that is, to
“exclusively . . . protect the interests of a purely commercial class
against unscrupulous commercial conduct.”227 Thus, it is evident
that Congress did not intend to abrogate standing requirements
from the Lanham Act, despite its broad “any person” language.228
In the instance of clear congressional intent, it makes sense to limit
220. Id. § 1(5) (emphasis added).
221. Id. § 2(a).
222. Id. § 2(a)(8) (emphasis added).
223. Id. § 2(a)(8) cmt. Specifically, the NCCUSL sought to “allow[ ] businessmen
to enjoin disparagement by competitors . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
224. Put simply, “of another” can be taken to mean another person’s business.
Or, in the case of the UDTPA’s definition of “person,” another corporation’s business.
Id. § 1.
225. See sources cited supra notes 13-14.
226. See Apgar, supra note 48, at 2400.
227. See Thill, supra note 53, at 377 (quoting Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y.,
Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
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the protections of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act strictly to corpo
rate competitors. With regard to the DTPAs, such judge-made law
does not prove as elementary as the Lanham Act’s standing
requirements.
The purpose inherent in the UDTPA was to achieve “uniform
ity in the law of unfair competition among the respective states.”229
Although the northeastern states may have adopted the UDTPA in
whole or in part to serve as their respective DTPAs, the standing
requirements that are associated with them do not achieve the
UDTPA’s ultimate goal of uniformity.230 There can be no uniform
ity in the law when standing requirements have resulted in new leg
islation from the bench231 that reads in otherwise unneeded criteria
to the law. Therefore, it certainly cannot be said that the DTPAs’
current standing requirements, which prohibit corporate competi
tors from bringing suit, are appropriate or even correct. Prior to
the enactment of a revised UDTPA, the NCCUSL must issue a pol
icy statement regarding standing requirements under the Act to
specifically include corporate competitors within the Act’s reach.
2. Adapting the Requirements Necessary to Bring a
Successful Claim as a Corporate Competitor
Under a Revised UDTPA
In addition to a clear policy statement on standing require
ments, a revised UDTPA must contain new terms concerning the
elements a competitor-plaintiff must prove to bring a successful
claim. In the prefatory note to the UDTPA, the NCCUSL states
that the “Act is designed to . . . remov[e] undue restrictions on the
229. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note (amended 1966,
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985) (citation omitted), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
230. “The more states that adopt the exact same law, the more uniformity there
is. The more uniformity, the easier it is to work from state to state.” McDade, supra
note 89, at 12. The current DTPAs equate to what could be considered the very antithesis of uniformity, creating laws that are nearly unnavigable from state to state.
231. The term “legislating from the bench” has come to be known as a form of
“judicial activism”—when the court oversteps its bounds to serve as an activist for a
particular cause. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a
Defense, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 207 (2007). But, “judge[s] should merely
interpret laws and not make them.” Press Release, Widener University School of Law,
Professor Barnett Speaks to Students about Constitutional Clichés (Apr. 25, 2008),
available at 2008 WLNR 9873528. That is, the courts are prohibited from “overreaching
their authority by creating laws or . . . construing laws based on their notions of what is
best for public policy.” Katherine Rengel, The Americans with Disabilities Act and In
ternet Accessibility for the Blind, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 543, 556
(2008).
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common law action for deceptive trade practices.”232 Keeping this
goal in mind, section 2(b) of the UDTPA states that “a complainant
need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion
or misunderstanding”233 in order to succeed upon its claims. Sec
tion 3(a) of the act further states that “[p]roof of monetary damage,
loss of profits, or intent to deceive [on the part of the defendant] is
not required”234 in order for a plaintiff to receive legal remedy.
The prefatory note goes on to say that the UDTPA affords a private
right of action to “persons likely to suffer pecuniary harm . . . .”235
In effect, through these policy disclosures and the plain language of
the UDTPA itself, the NCCUSL has significantly lessened the
plaintiff’s evidentiary burden. One of the only requirements neces
sary to bring suit under the UDTPA is that the “person,” or here,
the corporation, may suffer some form of monetary harm. It seems
that the only thing a plaintiff must prove is the “likelihood of public
deception,”236 which can be mounted through evidence of violation
of any of the twelve separate categories the UDTPA provides for
acts of deception.237
Although the UDTPA plainly states that a plaintiff need only
prove a possibility of monetary damage as a result of a “likelihood
of public deception,”238 many of the states of the Northeast have
contradicted these rather simple rules through judicial decisions
when dealing with competitor-plaintiffs. In particular, New Jersey
requires proof of ascertainable loss.239 New Jersey further states
that corporate competitors may only be afforded rights under the
act if they can prove that they “purchase[d] goods and services for
use in their business operations”;240 Massachusetts requires proof
232. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note (amended 1966,
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
233. Id. § 2(b).
234. Id. § 3(a).
235. Id. prefatory note. The term “pecuniary” is defined as “[o]f or relating to
money; monetary.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (9th ed. 2009).
236. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note.
237. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
238. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note.
239. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19 (West 2001). Connecticut, a state within the Sec
ond Circuit, has a similar provision. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2007).
Both Connecticut and New Jersey’s requirement of proof of ascertainable loss is in
clear opposition to section 3(a) of the UDTPA, which states, in relevant part, that
“[p]roof of monetary damage[ ] [or] loss of profits . . . is not required” in order for a
plaintiff to succeed on its claim. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a).
240. Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone Card Co., Inc., 756 A.2d 636, 638 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000). This requirement, although judge-made, is similar to Penn
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of the defendant’s “rascality”;241 and, finally, New York requires
proof of actual harm to the public.242
In a reenactment of a revised UDTPA, it may be worthwhile
for the NCCUSL to draw from the laws of states where these addi
tional requirements have worked, such as Massachusetts’s “rascal
ity” rule. Conversely, it would behoove the NCCUSL to consider
making a policy statement against the extraneous requirements of
both New York and New Jersey, since they serve only to limit the
plaintiff pool in deceptive trade practices actions.243
New York’s DTPA, General Business Law section 349, allows
corporate competitors to bring suit only in extremely limited cir
cumstances because of its requirement of actual harm to the public.
Although the New York statute purports to allow “any person”244
to bring suit, the “public interest requirement” virtually excludes
nearly all potential corporate claims for want of being able to prove
actual harm.245 Despite this “public interest” requirement, no
where in the text of section 349 is a requirement of “public harm”
sylvania’s statutory requirement that only transactions in which goods purchased for
“personal, family, or household” uses are protected under the state DTPA. 73 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2008); see Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 445-46
(Pa. 2001); see also World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 413, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2003). The wording of this statute negates the possibility of
corporate action. See infra notes 260-265 and accompanying text.
241. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A §§ 2, 11 (2008); see Damon v. Sun Co., 87 F.3d
1467, 1483 n.8 (1st Cir. 1996); Atl. Cement Co. v. S. Shore Bank, 730 F.2d 831, 834 (1st
Cir. 1984); Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 80, 88 (Mass. 1983); Atkinson v.
Rosenthal, 598 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Levings v. Forbes & Wallace,
Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
242. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004). New York’s requirement of
actual harm to the public runs afoul of the UDTPA’s policy statement that a plaintiff
need only prove a “likelihood of public deception.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRAC
TICES ACT prefatory note.
243. Opponents to such a course of action may argue that considerations of judi
cial economy are at play when courts choose to specifically limit a relative plaintiff pool
to a certain class of individuals or entities. Judicial economy relates to the “[e]fficiency
in the operation of the courts and the judicial system . . . [and] the efficient management
of litigation so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s
time and resources.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (9th ed. 2009). Eliminating a
party’s right to be heard deprecates fairness and encroaches upon rights established by
the Constitution. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 280 (1876) (asserting that the right
to be heard is one that is “founded in the first principles of natural justice”). The au
thor argues that the avoidance of trampling upon the rights of American citizens will
defeat any compelling interests in judicial economy.
244. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h).
245. “[T]he gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or harm to the
public interest.” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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touched upon or mentioned.246 The lack of any plain language in
the statute concerning the concept of “public harm” leads to the
conclusion that it is a standard that has been prudentially read into
New York’s DTPA.247 In contrast, even a brief reading of the
UDTPA reveals that a plaintiff need not prove an element of public
harm.248 Under the requirements of the UDTPA, a plaintiff need
only prove a “likelihood of public deception,”249 or, in the case of
New York’s statute, a likelihood of public harm.250 There is a vast
difference between a likelihood of harm and actual harm.251
Additionally, New York’s standard of “public harm” necessa
rily requires that the courts differentiate between “harm to a busi
ness as opposed to [harm to] the public at large.”252 Such a
requirement forces the court to decide on a case-by-case basis what
qualifies as substantially a business harm and what qualifies as sub
stantially a public harm. Moreover, courts often will decide that the
“gravamen”253 of the competitor-plaintiff’s claim is harm to his bus
iness without realizing that harm to a business and harm to the pub
lic interest are not mutually exclusive.254 Proving otherwise is
246. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349.
247. Genesco Entm’t v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (concluding
that a commercial claim is not within the ambit of section 349 “[d]espite the absence of
controlling New York precedent”). But cf. Constr. Tech., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 704 F.
Supp. 1212, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Inquiry in [section 349] cases thus need focus only
on whether deception was practiced, not on any separate public interest question. And
either the consumer or an injured competitor may sue.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
248. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3 (amended 1966, withdrawn
2000), 7A U.L.A. 289-90 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
249. Id.
250. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349; see also Securitron Magnalock Corp. v.
Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995) (“‘[C]orporate competitors now have stand
ing to bring a claim under this [statute] . . . so long as some harm to the public at large is
at issue.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc.,
786 F. Supp. 182, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1992))).
251. “Actual” is defined as “existing in act and not merely potentially.” MER
RIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 13 (11th ed. 2005). Compare this with the
definition of “likelihood,” which is taken to mean “probability,” id. at 721, which in
turn is defined as “something (as an event or circumstance) that is probable,” id. at 989.
An act that is probable is “supported by evidence strong enough to establish presump
tion but not proof.” Id.
252. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
253. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL
2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007).
254. In an interview with Robert C. Hinkley of the law firm Jones Day, Hinkley
suggested that corporations can operate without “damag[ing] the public interest in the
pursuit of profits.” Chris Luis, People v. Profits: A False Dichotomy?, 5 U.C. DAVIS
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difficult—it is only with formal economics or business training that
one can accurately predict what effects harm to a business will have
on the public.255
It is too burdensome, and simply unfair, to subject competitorplaintiffs to a standard that requires sophisticated training and an
ticipation of unpredictable (or unforeseeable) effects. As discussed
above, in the case of small businesses, most entrepreneurs are
young and inexperienced—further, they are new to the industry.256
Without a high level of business expertise, it would be nearly im
possible for such a plaintiff to sufficiently plead “public harm”
under such stringent circumstances. For these reasons, it is impera
tive that the NCCUSL disregard such requirements in a redrafting
of the UDTPA. New York’s interpretation of the law defeats the
NCCUSL’s original purpose as stated in the UDTPA’s prefatory
note: “to . . . remov[e] undue restrictions on . . . action[s] for decep
tive trade practices.”257
Along the same lines, the DTPA in states like New Jersey car
ries with it a requirement that is not within the plain language of
the UDTPA. In 1971, New Jersey’s DTPA was legislatively ex
panded to afford a right of action to “[a]ny person who suffers any
ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal.”258 Such
a requirement is nowhere to be found within the regulations of the
UDTPA, and, in fact, section 3(a) of the UDTPA explicitly states
that “[p]roof of monetary damage [or] loss of profits . . . is not reBUS. L.J. 6 (2004), available at http://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-5-no-1/People-v
Profits-A-False-Dichotomy.html. Hinkley goes on to state that people have long as
sumed that the connection between business and public harm was “mutually exclusive.”
Id. Hinkley asserts that “[t]hey are not, and the sooner we realize this, the better off
mankind will be.” Id.
255. “[T]he higher the level of education of the entrepreneur, the higher the level
of performance of the venture—whether measured as growth, profits, or earnings
power of the entrepreneur.” Mark Weaver, Entrepreneurship and Education: What Is
Known and Not Known About the Links Between Education and Entrepreneurial Activ
ity, in THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY 113, 117 (2006), available at http://www.sba.gov/
advo/research/sbe_06_ch05.pdf.
256. See generally Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior &
Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45,
100-01.
257. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note (amended 1966,
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
258. N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:8-19 (West 2001); see also Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht
Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1067 (N.J. 1988). The word “ascertain” is a transitive verb
defined as “to find out or learn with certainty.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 71 (11th ed. 2005). That being the case, logic demands that the term “as
certainable loss” be associated with certain loss, or, more commonly, actual loss.
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quired” in order for a plaintiff to receive remedy under the act.259
Although the New Jersey legislature was attempting to further ex
pand the possible plaintiff pool under the DTPA with the addition
of this language, in terms of the UDTPA, New Jersey did the oppo
site, foreclosing the avenue of litigation to competitor-plaintiffs un
able to prove an ascertainable loss.
New Jersey supports businesses that use the DTPA. This much
was made clear in Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Shuster Corp.,
a case that involved a dispute over computer parts between two
corporate entities.260 There, the court stated that
[b]usiness entities, like individual consumers, cover a wide range.
Some are poor, some wealthy; some are naive, some sophisti
cated; some are required to submit, some are able to dominate.
Even the most world-wise business entity can be inexperienced
and uninformed in a given consumer transaction. Unlawful prac
tices thus can victimize business entities as well as individual con
sumers. It may well be, of course, that certain practices unlawful
in a sale of personal goods to an individual consumer would not
be held unlawful in a transaction between particular business en
tities; the Act largely permits the meaning of ‘unlawful practice’
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. But to exclude busi
ness entities from any protection of the Act would contravene its
manifest purpose as well as its unambiguous language.261

Although this statement by the court seems to afford great le
niency to business plaintiffs as far as protection under the New
Jersey DTPA, in reality, it only serves to limit corporate competi
tors to claims involving the “sale of personal goods.”262
Such an interpretation precludes New Jersey’s corporate com
petitors from bringing suit under the New Jersey DTPA for any of
the deceptive trade practices affecting businesses that are clearly
delineated under the UDTPA. In New Jersey, corporate competi
tors can only sue under the DTPA when they are considered con
sumers, in the literal sense of the word.263 In a revised version of
259. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a).
260. Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 515 A.2d 246, 247 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
261. Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
262. Id. The New Jersey DTPA has been construed “to afford protection to cor
porate and commercial entities who purchase goods and services for use in their busi
ness operations.” Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone Card Co., 756 A.2d 636, 638 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
263. Arc Networks, Inc., 756 A.2d at 638 (“[T]he Act has been interpreted to
afford protection to corporate and commercial entities who purchase goods and ser
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the UDTPA, it would be advisable to mention that although New
Jersey’s method seems to be a fair reading of the DTPA, it is not
fair to limit corporate competitors to suits that are not in concert
with the full spectrum of the UDTPA’s purpose. The UDTPA’s
original purpose was to offer “remedy to persons likely to suffer
pecuniary harm for conduct involving either misleading identifica
tion of business or goods or false or deceptive advertis[ement].”264
Considering that deceptive trade practice actions originated from
common-law actions for trademark infringement,265 this sort of lim
itation is largely inappropriate.
Comparatively, the Massachusetts DTPA affords equal rights
to both consumers and corporations alike.266 By 1986, the Massa
chusetts legislature had amended chapter 93A such that section 11
provided a plausible cause of action for business plaintiffs.267 In
contrast to other DTPAs of the Northeast, the Massachusetts
DTPA is a viable statute in terms of providing guidance for a revi
sion of the UDTPA. Massachusetts law requires that the plaintiff
prove that the defendant acted with a degree of “rascality” in the
business scenario at hand.268 This requirement demands that the
vices for use in their business operations.”). This sounds of Pennsylvania’s UTP/CPL,
where private actions are restricted to “person[s] who purchase[ ] or lease[ ] goods or
services primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” 73 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2008). Due to this limitation, corporate competitors in the Com
monwealth of Pennsylvania may only bring suit if they themselves are acting in the
capacity of consumers. See Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Pa. 2001); see
also World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413,
446 (W.D. Pa. 2003). Competitors wishing to bring unfair competition claims must rely
upon “the Attorney General and district attorneys to bring actions in the name of the
Commonwealth,” thus negating a private right of action for the competitor-plaintiff.
Granite State Ins. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 320 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995).
264. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note (amended 1966,
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
265. Id.
266. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A §§ 2, 11 (2008).
267. Franke & Ballam, supra note 105, at 383.
268. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979). Contra Mass. Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 435, 438
(Mass. 1995) (“We view as uninstructive phrases such as ‘level of rascality’ and ‘rancid
flavor of unfairness’ in deciding questions of unfairness under G.L. c. 93A. We focus on
the nature of the challenged conduct and on the purpose and effect of that conduct as
the crucial factors in making a G.L. c. 93A determination.” (citations omitted)). The
First Circuit Court of Appeals sought to clarify the Propac-Mass language:
The [plaintiffs] argue that . . . the SJC abandoned the “rascality test” in stating
that it “view[s] as uninstructive phrases such as ‘level of rascality’ and ‘rancid
flavor of unfairness.’” Contrary to the [plaintiffs’] interpretation, the SJC was
simply recognizing that the mentioned phrases do not, despite their frequent
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defendant’s “objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality
that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and
tumble of the world of commerce.”269 To determine what kinds of
behavior rise to the level of rascality the Massachusetts DTPA re
fers to, it is necessary to look to earlier cases interpreting section 11.
These cases indicate that to act with a sufficient level of rascality,
one’s acts must be within a “recognized conception of unfair
ness.”270 Further, these acts must be “immoral, unethical, oppres
sive [or] unscrupulous”271 and of the kind that “would . . . cause
substantial injury to consumers, competitors or other
businessmen.”272
Although the UDTPA specifically provides in section 3(a) that
“[p]roof of . . . intent to deceive is not required” for a plaintiff to
succeed on its claims,273 the Massachusetts rascality requirement
does not necessarily speak to a requirement of intent. It is wholly
possible for a defendant to act “immoral[ly], unethical[ly], oppres
sive[ly] . . . unscrupulous[ly]”274 without the intent of doing so.275
In fact, this concept is likely the reason why the UDTPA does not
carry an intent requirement. Rather, the Massachusetts require
ment addresses the level of deception necessary for a defendant to
be found in violation of the DTPA. This standard would be a sound
addition to a revised UDTPA simply because it would provide
some amount of guidance as to the degree of the deception neces
sary for a corporate defendant to be found in violation of the act.
citation, lend much guidance in the fact-specific context of a chapter 93A
claim.
Damon v. Sun Co., 87 F.3d 1467, 1483 n.8 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
269. Levings, 396 N.E.2d at 153.
270. PMP Assocs. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1975).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (amended 1966, withdrawn
2000), 7A U.L.A. 289-90 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
274. PMP Assocs., 321 N.E.2d at 918.
275. The American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law has spoken to this
effect, stating that
a party can be found to have committed a deceptive practice, including false
advertising, under the FTC Act, the Lanham Act, and/or most state consumer
protection statutes . . . without intending to make a false representation, with
out knowing its representation to be false, with good faith in the truth of the
claim, and without actually having deceived any particular consumer or num
ber of consumers.
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 5 (2004).
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3. The Final Word: The Definition of “Deceptive Trade
Practice”
The term “deceptive trade practice” is not defined in the Lan
ham Act,276 the FTCA,277 the UDTPA,278 or any of the DTPAs of
the northeastern United States.279 In 1983, however, the FTC is
sued a Policy Statement on Deception, under which deception
would be found if “a representation, omission or practice is likely to
mislead consumers” who are presumed by the FTC to be “acting
reasonably in the circumstances.”280 Further, the deceptive prac
tices “must be . . . material.”281 Despite what seemed to be a clearcut definition of the term, Congress did not amend the FTCA to
include that definition within its provisions.282 Although this ambi
guity may have been intentional, there remains a way to provide a
firm definition for the term while still leaving the floodgates open
to the multitude of present and future violations.
In a revision of the UDTPA, the NCCUSL would be prudent
to allow the FTC’s definition of “deceptive trade practice” to sup
plement the current twelve-part UDTPA list of possibly deceptive
acts283 and simply change it to address the acts listed within the
UDTPA.284 But, the FTC’s definition285 must be changed to reflect
that the deceptive act or practice is likely to mislead any “per
son,”286 as opposed to only “consumers.” According to Black’s
Law Dictionary, a consumer is defined as “[a] person who buys
goods or services for personal, family, or household use, with no
intention of resale; a natural person who uses products for personal
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072 (2006).
277. Id. § 41.
278. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 265.
279. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110a (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2531 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1211 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 (West
2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-2
(West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451a (2006).
280. Letter from James C. Miller III, FTC Chairman, to John D. Dingell, Chair of
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Miller Letter], re
printed in In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84 (1984), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2.
284. Id. § 1.
285. See Miller Letter, supra note 280.
286. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting UDTPA’s definition of a
“person”).
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rather than business purposes.”287 The UDTPA is written such that
it affords a private right of action to corporate competitors—to in
clude the word “consumers” in a definition of “deceptive trade
practice” would undermine that very provision of the act. Accord
ingly, the NCCUSL should adopt the following language to provide
a clear definition of the term deceptive trade practice: a deceptive
trade practice is a representation, omission, practice, or act that is
likely to mislead a person in a material way, despite the presumption
of that person’s reasonable actions under the circumstances. 288 This
new definition would not supplant the original UDTPA’s definition;
rather, it would support it by negating confusion as to what exactly
constitutes a “deceptive trade practice” in the future.
C. Allowing the DTPAs to Address the Purpose for Which They
Were Created—Unfair Competition Through Trademark
Infringement
The DTPAs all have one trait in common—the federal and
model acts out of which they were born all carry the goal of ban
ning deceptive practices considered detrimental to competitors’
businesses.289 Even after the FTC was granted the power to protect
consumers,290 Congress drafted the language of the FTCA such that
the act would serve as prohibitive of “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”291 The fact that, for this al
leged consumer protection provision, Congress chose language that
is indicative of a relation to business competition speaks volumes as
287. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 358 (9th ed. 2009).
288. The applicable statutes and case law inspired this author-written definition.
For example, the part of the definition specifying “reasonable actions under the circum
stances” came from the FTCA’s “reasonable consumer” standard. Lemley, supra note
26, at 318. The word “consumer” was removed from the FTCA standard in order to
both reflect the fact that the vast majority of the DTPAs cite plaintiffs as “any person”
(i.e., both consumers and corporations), and also to reflect the UDTPA’s less stringent
statutory requirements, such that corporate plaintiffs would be able to bring suit with
out any ambiguity. See Clinton, supra note 123, at 387-88. The language concerning
being materially misled was lifted partially from New York’s DTPA. N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004); Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2003). Fi
nally, the phrase “representation, omission, practice, or act” was borrowed from the
language of the most prominent sections of the UDTPA. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 265.
289. See Scheuerman, supra note 77, at 11.
290. Id. at 12.
291. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Mize, supra note 78,
at 656. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the phrase “affecting commerce” is de
fined as “touching or concerning business, industry, or trade.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION
ARY 65 (9th ed. 2009).
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to the drafters’ intent. This being the case, Congress likely did not
intend to close the door on business protection in its pursuit to af
ford consumers a private right of action for deceptive trade prac
tices.292 This conclusion is further evidenced by one of the reasons
cited for the creation of the UDTPA—the need to stop “[d]eceptive
conduct constituting unreasonable interference with another’s pro
motion and conduct of business.”293
In recognizing that the UDTPA addresses unfair competition
methods that arguably could be covered by either the FTCA or the
Lanham Act,294 one question is begged: why do the majority of the
DTPAs295 fail to recognize that trademark infringement296 is a valid
cause of action?297 As noted above, the courts of New York have
292. At its core, a deceptive trade practice action can be said to be loosely framed
around an action for trademark infringement. The vast majority of deceptive trade
practices claims center on the act of “passing off,” or the “imitation of . . . marks . . .
which had developed trade significance.” Id. The UDTPA recognizes that most decep
tive trade practice actions are born out of disputes of or relating to trademark matters
and divides deceptive conduct into two classes—those “involving . . . misleading trade
identification” and those involving “false or deceptive advertising.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note. As a clear-cut rule concerning infringement
suits brought under the state’s DTPA is currently debated in New York, see Karam
Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 27, 2007), the majority of this section will focus on the differences in opinion in
that state.
293. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note.
294. Dole, supra note 11, at 486 (explaining that the UDTPA strictly forbade the
substitution of goods, trademark infringement, false designations of origin, false adver
tising, disparagement, bait-and-switch advertising, pricing fraud, as well as conduct
tending to create confusion, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings).
295. The DTPAs are in theory (but perhaps not in practice) the statutory off
spring of a model act meant to bring “uniformity [to] the law of unfair competition.”
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note.
296. Professor McCarthy notes that a finding of trademark infringement hinges
upon the public’s likelihood of confusion. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 2:8. He goes
on to state that “trademark infringement is a type of unfair competition.” Id. § 2.7.
In many factual situations, the same result is reached whether the legal wrong
is called trademark infringement or unfair competition. In such cases the
courts often lump them together and speak of them as identical concepts. To
day, the keystone of that portion of unfair competition law which relates to
trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the
buying public. Whatever route one travels, whether by trademark infringe
ment or unfair competition, the signs give direction to the same enquiry—
whether defendant’s acts are likely to cause confusion.
Id. § 2.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
297. One can only assume that New York law correlates trademark infringement
actions brought under DTPAs with business harm as opposed to consumer harm. How
ever, one commentator recently asserted the following: “[T]he aim [of trademark] is to
provide consistency for the consumer who has previously purchased and been satisfied
by a product bearing the mark XYZ. When another firm labels its product as XYZ, the
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not yet reached a consensus as to the status of the state’s DTPA
trademark infringement actions brought by corporate competi
tors.298 The prevailing opinion in New York is that trademark ac
tions brought by competitor-plaintiffs arising under the DTPA
generally fail to allege a sufficient level of harm to the public inter
est.299 Moreover, “trademark infringement actions alleging only
general consumer confusion do not” rise to the level of harm to the
public interest required to bring a successful motion under the
state’s DTPA.300
When one looks to an analogous area of the law—the issuance
of injunctions in trademark infringement actions—it seems as if
New York’s stance on the issue of harm to the public interest is way
off the mark. When considering whether to issue an injunction in a
trademark infringement action, the courts use a four-factor test to
determine whether such relief is appropriate.301 Part of this test
provides that the court must evaluate whether the defendant’s in
fringement of the plaintiff’s mark will harm “the public interest.”302
In discussing the public-interest factor in relation to the issuance of
injunctions, district courts have acknowledged that “[i]nfringement
of a trademark is inherently contrary to the public interest.”303
The Third Circuit has previously ruled that the public interest,
when viewed through the prism of trademark litigation, should be
considered “a synonym for the right of the public not to be
deceived or confused.”304 As injunctions are the most common
real damage is to the consumer . . . .” Ryan McLeod, iBrief, Injunction Junction: Re
membering the Proper Function and Form of Equitable Relief in Trademark Law, 2006
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0013, ¶ 19 (2006), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/
articles/pdf/2006DLTR0013.pdf (emphases added).
298. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL
2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (noting an intracircuit split).
299. Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 5150,
1997 WL 137443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
300. Id.; see N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004).
301. Prior to issuing a remedial injunction, the courts must consider whether “(1)
[the] plaintiff prevailed on the merits of its claim; (2) [the] plaintiff would suffer irrepa
rable harm absent injunctive relief; (3) the harm to the plaintiff would outweigh any
harm to [the] defendant; and (4) the injunction [will] adversely affect the public inter
est.” Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10, 15 n.2 (1st Cir.
1999) (citing A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997)).
302. Id.
303. Connelly v. ValueVision Media, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (D. Minn.
2005).
304. Optician’s Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d
Cir. 1990); see also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274
(7th Cir. 1976) (“A ‘trademark’ is not that which is infringed. What is infringed is the
right of the public to be free of confusion . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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form of relief under both the UDTPA and the DTPAs,305 it follows
that the same terms that apply to the issuance of an injunction in a
common-law trademark-infringement action—that trademark in
fringement is contrary to the public interest—ought to be included
in the requirements of an action for trademark infringement under
a DTPA.306
New York’s stance on the matter of harm to the public interest
is diametrically opposed to the regulations set forth in the UDTPA.
In contrast to the New York statute,307 the UDTPA proscribes de
ceptive conduct that will “create[ ] a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding.”308 If consumer confusion is a sufficient basis
for bringing an action under the UDTPA, how can the State of New
York claim that under its DTPA, consumer confusion is simply not
enough?309
Similarly, with the surrounding circuits asserting that trade
mark infringement is indeed contrary to the public interest, how
can judicial interpretations of New York’s DTPA claim otherwise?
As stated in a recent law review article, “For a law with the purpose
of protecting the public, the actual consideration of the public’s in
terest . . . would seem necessary.”310
The “keystone”311 here is the public’s likelihood of confusion.
New York’s DTPA is missing this keystone, and the competitor
plaintiff’s option to bring forth a trademark action has crumbled
entirely due to a faulty interpretation of the law. The DTPAs were
crafted such that competitors and consumers alike could bring suit
for deceptive acts. To strip one class of plaintiffs of its rights to
bring what ought to be the most common form of action under the
DTPA’s tenets—trademark infringement—is inherently unfair.
305. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (amended 1966, withdrawn
2000), 7A U.L.A. 289-90 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
306. The author is of the opinion that the courts ought to allow larger, more fi
nancially stable corporations to act as the “‘vicarious’ avenger of consumer rights,”
such that the voice of the “trusting” consumer can be heard. Camel Hair & Cashmere
Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1986).
307. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004).
308. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(12).
309. See Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 96 Civ.
5150, 1997 WL 137443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
310. McLeod, supra note 297, ¶ 25.
311. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 2:8 (“[T]he keystone of that portion of unfair
competition law which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confu
sion in the minds of the buying public.”).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the impossible puzzle that has been made of corpo
rate rights under the various DTPAs, now is not a good time to be a
competitor-plaintiff that needs to litigate in more than one state.
With judicial interpretations of the DTPAs that virtually eliminate
any chance that a competitor-plaintiff may have had to win its case,
businesses, both small and large, will have to resign to the fact that
they will not be able to fully litigate their claims in a court of law
unless the DTPAs undergo an overhaul. The missing piece to this
puzzle, the competitor-plaintiff’s last bastion of hope, rests with the
UDTPA, which was withdrawn in the year 2000 due to its alleged
obsolescence.312
The cases that deny standing to corporate competitors seeking
to bring trademark infringement actions under DTPAs have erred
on the wrong side of the law. How can a system that has put forth
laws to protect its citizens against unfair and deceptive trade prac
tices reconcile the assertion that consumer confusion, which is the
basis of deceptive trade practice theory, does not rise to the level of
importance necessary to warrant being a public interest? If any
thing, consumer confusion is the hallmark of a dysfunctional system
at odds with its legislative goals.
Through examination of the actual language of the DTPAs, it
becomes clear that the majority of these statutes do not seek to
exclude corporate competitors from bringing suit. In fact, in most
cases, their very language encourages such legal action. Judicial in
terpretation of these statutes has created confusion—where one
competitor-plaintiff may succeed on its claims, another may fail
simply for crossing another state’s border. It simply cannot be the
case that the states desire this sort of confusion and inequality be
tween their laws, especially when such a viable alternative exists.
The legislative purpose of the DTPAs, to protect consumers
through the maintenance of a competitive marketplace,313 would
best be served by the adoption of a revised UDTPA. The UDTPA
is a champion of trademark law and recognizes that immeasurable
value is attached to each product’s individual mark. Trademark
functions to inform the public, and, in this time of economic uncer
tainty, we as a nation need the stability that trademark can offer the
marketplace more than ever. If the states wish to have any sort of
312. Menell, supra note 98, at 1392.
313. Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Institutional Servs., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 666, 673
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
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uniformity among their laws, or even a functioning free market,
they must be willing to take another chance on the UDTPA.
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